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PREFACE 
This  Phase Zero NASA Safety Review Data Package has been prepared by RCA 
Ast ro-Elect ron ics D i v i s i o n  f o r  t h e  Ca l i f o rn ia  I n s t i t u t e  O f  Technology J e t  
Propuls ion Laboratory.  
the  NASA s a f e t y  process on prev ious spacecraf t  programs i n  the  prepara t ion  o f  
t h i s  package. Th is  package a l s o  r e f l e c t s  the  con t inu ing  e f f o r t  a t  RCA t o  
r e f i n e  our  spacecraf t  sa fe ty  packages. 
t o t a l l y  responsive t o  the  NASA safety  requirements (as d e t a i l e d  i n  NHB 
1700.7A, and KHB 1700.7A). T h i s  package has been prepared as o u t l i n e d  i n  
JSC-13830A and t h e  Mars Observer sa fe ty  ana lys is  has been performed us ing the  
gu ide l ines  i n  JSC-11123, as spec i f i ed  i n  JSC-13830A. RCA i s  proud t o  present 
the  Mars Observer Phase Zero NASA Safety Review Data Package. 
RCA has made maximum use o f  t h e  experience gained w i t h  
We be l i eve  t h a t  t h i s  package i s  
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1.0 The Mars Observer Spacecraft 
The Mars Observer i s  a planetary exp lo ra t i on  spacecraft t h a t  w i l l  be used 
t o  explore Mars. The spacecraft i s  being b u i l t  f o r  t he  C a l i f o r n i a  
I n s t i t u t e  Of Technology Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) by RCA 
Astro-Electronics D iv is ion .  RCA, as the  prime contractor ,  provides the  
spacecraf t  bus and i t s  associated subsystems and conducts the  system 
i n t e g r a t i o n  and t e s t  a c t i v i t i e s  f o r  t he  e n t i r e  f l i g h t  system. The 
s c i e n t i f i c  payload i s  provided by JPL t o  RCA f o r  i n t e g r a t i o n  w i t h  the  
spacecraf t  bus. The s c i e n t i f i c  payload subcontracts a re  managed by JPL. 
This  package i s  d i rec ted  toward the  RCA provided bus and spacecraft 
subsystems wh i l e  the  s c i e n t i f i c  payload i s  discussed i n  an appendix t o  
t h i s  package t o  be suppl ied by JPL. 
1 
0 1.1 Mission Overview 
The Mars Observer Program has as its primary objectives a study of the 
geochemistry , atmospheric dynamics , atmosphere/surface interactions , 
seasonal variations and magnetic field characteristics of Mars. 
The instrument complement is a g a m  ray spectrometer, a radar altimeter, 
an imaging system, a pressure modulated infrared radiometer, a thermal 
emission spectrometer, a magnetometer, an ultra-stable oscillator (for 
radio science) and a visual and infrared mapping spectrometer. 
These instruments were selected for their synergistic complementarity as 
well as their individual capabilities with the aim of providing an 
overall, comprehensive global data set to allow the systematic 
interdisciplinary study of Mars required to achieve the overall program 
goals. 
The Mars Observer spacecraft was specifically designed with the objective 
o f  accommodating the science requirements of this set of instruments, 
consistent with the requirement to utilize existing hardware and designs 
as dictated by the overall Planetary Observer philosophy. The hybrid RCA 
Satcom/TIROS/DMSP design f ulf i 1 1  s both of these requirements 
simultaneously. 
The strategy to be used for MO is to operate all instruments essentially 
continuously, thereby providing a global data set from which seasonal 
variations and a comprehensive understanding of planetary morphology can 
be derived. This includes study of both large scale features at several 
spectral bands and very fine scale features (down to 1 meter surface 
resolution by the Mars Observer Camera) in regions of interest. 
Another key issue is the question o f  the volatile content of the Martian 
surface and its seasonal variation. A sun-synchronous orbit was 
specifically chosen to eliminate diurnal variations of observations so 
that longer term effects can be unambiguously assessed. 
In addition, the MO spacecraft will carry a sensitive magnetometer to 
determine if Mars has an intrinsic planetary field and, if so, its 
magnitude. This is a key scientific topic not only for the understanding 
of Mars but also for comparative planetology. 
2 
0 1.2 Spacecraft Descr ip t ion  
The system design f o r  t h e  Mars Observer Spacecraft i s  based predominantly 
on the  Structure,  Propulsion, and Thermal subsystems, and the  So lar  Array 
assembly of t he  RCA Satcom Ku-Band spacecraft, and the  A t t i t u d e  and 
A r t i c u l a t i o n  Control,  Command and Data Handling, and Power Subsystem o f  
t h e  RCA Advanced TIROS-N and DMSP Block 50-2 spacecraft.  The TIROS and 
DMSP programs a re  long running Atlas-launched RCA spacecraft w i t h  proven 
on-orb i t  performance. The only Mars Observer assembly-level items w i thout  
f l i g h t  her i tage on RCA spacecraft a re  the  B ip rope l l an t  p o r t i o n  o f  t he  
Propulsion Subsystem and the  High-Gain Antenna (HGA) assembly, a component 
o f  t h e  Telecomnunications Subsystem. The m a j o r i t y  o f  t he  components f o r  
these items are however f l i g h t  q u a l i f i e d  and have been f l i g h t  proven i n  
several spacecraf t  appl i cat ions . 
A pre-assembly view o f  t he  Mars Observer Spacecraft i s  shown i n  Figure 
7-1. The spacecraft mass i s  723.4 Kg, and p rope l l an t  mass i s  1345.9 Kg. 
The TOS adaptor mass i s  40.1 Kg. The t o t a l  spacecraf t  mass a t  l i f t o f f  
( l e s s  the  TOS upper stage) i s  2155.0 Kg ( t h i s  f i g u r e  inc ludes a margin o f  
45.6 Kg, which w i l l  be used). The paragraphs below provide an overview o f  
t h e  various spacecraft subsystems. Safety c r i t i c a l  spacecraft subsystems 
a r e  described i n  more d e t a i l  i n  sec t ion  2.0 o f  t h i s  package. 
1.2.1 Comnunications 
The Mars Observer Telecommunications Subsystem i s  a l l  new t o  meet the  
unique requirements o f  t he  MO mission. The Telecomnunications Subsystem 
o f  TIROS/DMSP and Satcom K a re  not  app l i cab le  t o  the  MO mission. 
The design incorporates two GFP NASA X-band transponders (NXTs) and two 
GFP command detec tor  u n i t s  (CDUs). It also inc ludes two 40W ( r f  output) 
t r a v e l i n g  wave tube amp l i f i e rs  (TWTAs), a 1.5-meter diameter HGA w i t h  
2-axis gimbals and associated redundant con t ro l  e lec t ron ics ,  a hyb r id  
mixer, passive rf components (switches, f i l t e r s ,  e tc ) ,  an assembly o f  s i x  
low-gain antennas (LGAs), and a medium-gain antenna (MGA). 
Apart from the  GFP, on l y  the  NXTs a re  gener i ca l l y  new t o  the  RCA candidate 
spacecraf t  buses. 
The Telecomnunications Subsystem provides the  DSN-compatible X-band 
communications t o  and from the  Ear th f o r  radiometr ic t rack ing ,  telemetry, 
comnanding, and rad io  science. Command access through any o f  t he  th ree  
antenna systems i s  continuously ava i lab le .  Transmission mode (low-, 
medium-, o r  high-gain) i s  selectable by ground command. 
3 
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Figure 1-1. Pre-Assembly View o f  t h e  Mars Observer Spacecraft 
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0 1.2.2 Command And Data Handling . 
. 
The command And Data Handling (C&DH) Subsystem is a direct application of 
flight proven TIROS/DMSP equipment, modified to incorporate the GFP 
Payload Data Subsystem (PDS).In the c o m n d  role to control and 
reconfigure the spacecraft, it receives demodulated incoming signals, 
performs on-board computation, executes both received and 
computer-generated comnands, and provides precision clocks for use 
throughout the spacecraft. In the telemetry role, the C&DH Subsystem 
synchronizes, times, collects, digitizes, multiplexes, formats, routes, 
stores, and plays back science instrument data, command verification, CPU 
memory dump, and payload and spacecraft engineering data. 
1.2.3 Attitude And Articulation Control 
The Attitude and Articulation Control Subsystem (AACS) is derived from the 
DMSP Block 50-2 design, in particular that of Flight S-15. 
The AACS, in conjunction with the control segment of the C&DH Subsystem 
and the Propulsion and Pyrotechnics Subsystem, provides all functions 
associated with attitude sensing and control, appendage articulation, 
powered flight guidance, and navigation throughout all phases o f  the 
mission. It is comprised of an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) which 
includes four gyros and a redundant accelerometer package, a Mars horizon 
sensor assembly ("SA), a 6-slit strapdown celestial mapping sensor (CSA), 
a 4 r  steradian sun sensor (4nSS), four reaction wheel assemblies 
(RWAs) , and software. 
1.2.4 Electrical Power 
The power subsystem is derived f rom the TIROS/DHSP boost-discharge Direct 
Energy Transfer (DET) design. The basic DET design has been tailored to 
meet the environmental and load requirements associated with the Mars 
Observer mission. The power subsystem provides the required generation, 
storage, control and distribution of electrical power for the spacecraft 
during all mission phases. 
The Mars Observer Solar Array has two deployment configurations. For the 
cruise and orbit insertion phases of the mission, the solar array is 
partially deployed with the boom still stowed. During the mapping and 
quarantine phases the solar array is fully deployed. The mission phases 
are discussed i n  section 1.5. 
1 .2.5 Thermal Control 
The thermal design of the Mars Observer Spacecraft is derived from the RCA 
TIROS/DMSP, and Satcom Ku-Band Spacecraft. This basic, flight proven, 
design has been tailored to the widely varying thermal environments 
associated with the Mars Observer mission. Thermal control i s  
accomplished by passive means where possible, with minimum resort to 
quasi-active devices (such as heaters and louvers). 
5 
The thermal design of the Mars Observer Spacecraft has been c a r e f u l l y  
opt imized w i t h  a specia l  view t o  power consumption, u t i l i z a t i o n  of 
external  f luxes,  and minimum mass. The requi red thermal con t ro l  i s  
accomplished by the  jud ic ious app l i ca t i on  o f  m u l t i l a y e r  i n s u l a t i o n  
blankets,  heaters, thermal cont ro l  e lec t ron ics ,  i n s u l a t i n g  and conducting 
s t r u c t u r a l  elements, rad iators ,  surface f in ishes ,  tapes, and louvers as 
we1 1 as conf igurat i .on design o f  the  spacecraf t  cons t i tuent  elements, 
thermal coupl ing o f  body-mounted science GFP w i t h  the  equipment enclosure, 
and use of the  permanently space-viewing s ide  (-Y) f o r  r a d i a t i v e  detector  
coo l ing  and heat shedding. 
a 
1.2.6 S t ruc ture  
The Structure,  Cabling, and Mechanisms f o r  the  Mars Observer Spacecraft 
bus are der ived from the  primary s t ruc tu re  o f  Satcom Ku-Band. The 
r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h i s  choice i s  t o  minimize mass, t o  ensure c o m p a t i b i l i t y  
w i t h  the  TOS upper stage, t o  reduce thermal heater load requirements by 
nes t ing  propuls ion tanks ins ide the  s t ruc tu re  i n  c lose prox imi ty  t o  
e lec t ron i c  equipment, and t o  use an e x i s t i n g  f l i g h t  q u a l i f i e d  s t ruc tu re .  
The only  major changes form the Satcom Ku-Band are i n  the  Solar  Array 
geometry and deployment sequencing. 
1.2.7 Propulsion 
The Mars Observer Propulsion Subsystem provides a l l  the  a t t i t u d e  cont ro l ,  
t r a j e c t o r y  correct ions,  and o r b i t  i n s e r t i o n  and t r i m  maneuvers necessary 
t o  reach Mars and t o  extensively map the  mart ian surface. Accomplishment 
of these maneuvers i s  performed by two independent propuls ion systems, one 
employing hydrazine, the  other b ip rope l lan ts .  The a t t i t u d e  cont ro l ,  
Mars-orbi t  t r i m  system uses f l ight-proven, l o n g - l i f e ,  RCA Satcom hydrazine 
blowdown propuls ion system design and hardware. A state-of- the-art  
pressure-fed, Earth-storable, b ip rope l l an t  system provides the  desired 
h igher  performance f o r  major mission maneuvers. 
The propuls ion systems proposed are t y p i c a l  o f  those b u i l t  by R C A  f o r  i t s  
communications and environmental spacecraft.  RCA has f lown o r  has 
in-bui  I d  more than 27 comunications-spacecraft  hydrazine propuls ion 
systems i d e n t i c a l  t o  the  blowdown system proposed. Two o f  these systems 
have each demonstrated more than 8-1/2 years o f  f lawless operat ion p r i o r  
t o  p rope l l an t  dep le t ion  and s a t e l l i t e  re t i rement  f r o m  service.  For the  
TIROWDMSP weather spacecraft,  RCA has b u i l t ,  o r  has i n  process, 25 
pressure-fed regulated multi-engine, h igh- thrust ,  hydrazine (2 450N)/ 
n i t rogen propuls ion systems. 
A l l  the  propuls ion subsystem components are f l i g h t  q u a l i f i e d  and most have 
been f l igh t -p roven on RCA spacecraft w i t h  the  exception o f  the  0.94-111 
(37- in.)  diameter p rope l l an t  tank, which w i l l  be q u a l i f i e d  f o r  Mars 
Observer. Q u a l i f i c a t i o n  i s  an extension o f  R C A ' s  e x i s t i n g  tank design 
technology. RCA was ' t h e  first t o  v e r i f y  use o f  c a p i l l a r y  p rope l lan t  
management devices f o r  propel lant  con t ro l  on synchronous spacecraf t  and 
has q u a l i f i e d  a ser ies of tanks o f  increas ing diameter s ince RCA Satcom-F1 a f l i g h t  i n  1975. 
- 
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1.3 S c i e n t i f i c  Payload 
The spacecraft  s c i e n t i f i c  payload d e s c r i p t i o n  and hazard reports a r e  
provided by JPL i n  an appendix t o  t h i s  s a f e t y  package. 
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a 1.4 TOS/STS Interface 
The  Mars Observer spacecraft  wil l  use the h i g h  performance Transfer O r b i t  
Stage (TOS) which w i l l  be GFE (provided by MSFC). The  TOS program i s  
managed by Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC)  w i t h  des ign ,  development, 
production, and operations being handled by the Martin Marietta 
Corporation. .The Mars Observer/TOS/STS in te r face  i s  described i n  the 
following sections.  
1.4.1 Electr ical  Interface 
Electr ical  interfaces  between the Mars Observer spacecraft and the  TOS, as  
shown i n  f igure 1-2,  f a l l  i n t o  two categories: 
o Spacecraft-to TOS avionics interfaces .  
o Spacecraft-to-Spacecraft EASE u s i n g  the TOS stage as  
a pass-through 
The spacecraft EASE is  comprised of a Power Master U n i t  (PMU) and a 
Command Master U n i t  (CMU). Interfaces between the spacecraft EASE and the  
TOS EASE consist  solely of an Orbiter power feed from the TOS E A S E  
terminal board and i s  fused by the spacecraft EASE. 
All spacecraft t o  TOS e lec t r ica l  interfaces  use c i r cu la r  separation 
connectors located a t  the  spacecraft separation j o i n t .  A w i r i n g  harness 
on the spacecraft adaptor links these connections w i t h  the  adaptor-to-TOS 
connectors. RCA wil l  be supplying this  wir ing  harness and both matching 
halves of the  connectors. 
The spacecraft-to-TOS avionics interfaces consist  of connections from the  
spacecraft t o  the TOS Majority Vote Sequencer (MVS). After SRM burnout, 
redundant s ignals  from the TOS Majority Vote Sequencer called 'system 
Pre-Arm" and "System A r m ' ,  wi l l  drive latching relays of the  same names 
housed i n  the  spacecraft which pre-arm and arm the  spacecraft pyrotechnic, 
thruster f i r e ,  and th rus t e r  latch valve command buses. Shortly before the 
prescribed spacecraft/TOS separation time, a similar "Separation Ready" 
signal wi l l  be sent  from the  MVS t o  the  spacecraft computer which w i l l  
subsequently command previously armed pyro-actuated propellant isolat ion 
valves t o  open. The  spacecraft computer w i l l  then command the  
spacecraft/TOS Marmon clamp to  separate. Redundant design techniques 
employed i n  the  MVS combined w i t h  the "three i n h i b i t "  design of spacecraft 
pyrotechnic and propulsion control c i r c u i t s  precludes the poss ib i l i t y  of a 
two-failure hazard a s  i s  prescribed by NHB 1700.7A. These functions w i l l  
a l so  t o l e r a t e  a single-point fa i lure  i n  the  MVS o r  the spacecraft without 
jeopardizing mission success. 
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Figure 1-2. Spacecraft/TOS/Orbiter Electr ical  Interfaces. 
The  baseline i s  t o  not include a telecomnunications package on the TOS 
f l i g h t  vehicle and t o  use the X-band transmitter and d ig i t a l  tape 
recording f a c i l i t i e s  on the Mars Observer spacecraft t o  transmit and/or 
record TOS telemetry a f t e r  deployment from the  Orbiter. As shown i n  
f igure  1-2, a s e r i a l  telemetry stream ( a t  1.5 kbps) of engineering data i s  
sent from the spacecraft Cross-Strap U n i t  (XSU) t o  the TOS telemetry 
encoder where the stream i s  combined w i t h  TOS telemetry (which i s  a t  14.5 
kbps) t o  produce a combined spacecraft and TOS stream a t  a 16-kbps ra te .  
The  combined stream will  be sent back t o  the  XSU where i t  will  be routed 
t o  the X-band transmitter and the spacecraft d i g i t a l  tape recorder. The 
combined stream w i l l  a l so  be sent from the TOS telemetry encoder t o  the 
Orbiter Payload Data Interleaver ( P D I )  f o r  crew display and transmission 
t o  the ground. Aware of PDI requirements on the format of telemetry 
frames, RCA and OSC a r e  developing s t r a t eg ie s  f o r  creating a 
combined-stream format compatible w i t h  the  PDI. The TOS 
encoder/spacecraft e l ec t r i ca l  in te r faces ,  which wi l l  subsequently be 
defined i n  d e t a i l ,  will  minimize coupling w i t h  other spacecraft/TOS 
c i r c u i t s  i n  the  EMI/EMC environment. a 
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The spacecraft will a l so  pass e lectr ical  interfaces through the TOS stage 
t o  the spacecraft EASE. Serial spacecraft commands ( a t  2 kbps) will  be 
sent  from the spacecraft EASE to  the spacecraft upon crew in i t i a t ion  via 
the Orbiter Standard Swi tch  Panel (SSP) o r  GPC Keyboard/MDM, or upon 
transmissions from the Ground Support Equipment ( G S E )  via the T-0 
umbilical. Serial  spacecraft telemetry ( a t  2 kbps )  wi l l  be sent across 
the  TOS t o  the spacecraft EASE f o r  the PDI o r  f o r  transmission t o  the GSE 
over the T-0 umbilical. A discrete command from the SSP, t h r o u g h  the 
spacecraft EASE and through the TOS ASE wi l l  be supplied t o  the spacecraft 
t o  allow safing of a l l  hazardous spacecraft functions simultaneously. 
Orbiter power conditioned by the spacecraft EASE wil l  be provided t o  the 
spacecraft t h r o u g h  the TOS. Maximum anticipated power t o  be delivered t o  
the spacecraft i s  300W. Power feeds on the TOS AS€, on the TOS i t s e l f ,  
and on the spacecraft a r e  being sized according t o  the requirements o f  
JSC-07700, Volume XIV. Signal feeds a re  being designed and shielded t o  
accommodate the EMI/EMC requirements of the same document, and TOS and 
spacecraft grounding w i l l  be t o  a single point on the TOS A X .  
1.4.2 Mechanical Interfaces 
Figure 1-3 shows the spacecraft/upper stage cargo element fo r  the Mars 
Observer mission. The spacecraft i s  cantilevered from the upper stage 
through a conical adapter and i s  located coaxially w i t h  the Orbiter cargo 
bay centerline.  The allowable envelope f o r  the cargo element, t o  include 
dynamic and thermal d i s t o r t i o n  e f fec ts ,  i s  the  Orbiter payload c lear  
envelope. The spacecraft l i e s  well w i t h i n  t h i s  envelope. 
The adapter provides the interface flange f o r  the bolted attachment t o  the 
upper stage and, i n  addition, l imits  the conductive thermal c o u p l i n g  
between the spacecraft and TOS. Figure 1-4 shows the preliminary design 
of the adapter which i s  currently baselined fo r  the Mars Observer 
mission. The Mars Observer design uses the standard unmodified TOS 
s t ructural  interface.  This 91.91-inch (2335-mm) diameter forward r i n g  
frame structure contains 120 threaded mounting holes on a 90.6-inch 
(2301-mm) base c i rc le .  Indexing (clocking) of the attachment holes i s  
achieved by a 1' offse t  i n  the position of the hole on the +XMO (+ZT) 
axis ,  as  shown i n  the figure. T h i s  indexing controls the MO/TOS 
coordinate system relationship t o  t h a t  shown i n  Figure 1-5. 
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Figure 1-3 Mars Observer/TOS Cargo Element 
To ensure adapter/TOS interface compatibility, the attachment holes i n  the 
RCA adapter will  be controlled by a d r i l l  f ix ture  supplied by OSC, and an 
adapter/TOS f i t  check wi l l  be performed a t  OSC as par t  of the 
spacecraft/upper-stage integration e f for t .  T h e  f l i g h t  attachment hardware 
wi l l  be supplied by OSC and installed by OSC personnel w i t h  support from 
RCA.  Access t o  the attachment bolts i s  gained from the spacecraft side of 
the interface.  
Analysis of the loading across the s t ructural  interface wi l l  be performed 
dur ing  Mars Observer program development t o  verify the in tegr i ty  of the 
mechanical j o in t .  The effect  of the loading transferred t o  the TOS 
forward r i n g  frame from the conical spacecraft adapter ( k i c k  loads) will 
be analyzed by OSC and the adequacy of the s t ructure  verified.  The r i n g  
frame i s  sized t o  support a cantilevered mass of up t o  9,000 l b  (19,841 
kg)  w i t h  a C G  located up to 100 inches (2540 mm) forward of the 
interface.  As the Mars Observer spacecraft and adapter weigh 2155 kg and 
have a combined C G  located 1255 mm forward of the interface,  no problems 
are  anticipated. 
The Electrical  Airborne support Equipment ( E A S E )  f o r  the Mars Observer 
0 
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spacecraft (namely the  Power Master U n i t  and the  Command Master U n i t  ) are 
mounted on the  TOS a f t  c rad le  ASE a t  the  two loca t ions  shown i n  Figure 
1-6. A t  these locat ions,  t he  spacecraft ASE l i e s  w e l l  w i t h i n  the  O r b i t e r  
payload envelope. The spacecraft ASE i s  mounted on the  "hatbandIt 
secondary s t ruc tu re  which i s  t he  standard method o f  a t tach ing  f l i g h t  
hardware t o  the  TOS a f t  c rad le  primary s t ruc tu re .  This a l lows f l e x i b i l i t y  
i n  the  attachment o f  Mars Observer av ion ics  w i t h  no impact on the  design 
of t he  primary (cradle)  s t ructure.  
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Figure 1-4. Spacecraft/TOS Adaptor 
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Figure  1-6. Equipment Mounting on TOS Cradle 
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1.5 Mission Scenario 
An overview of t he  Mars Observer mission i s  depicted i n  f i g u r e  1-7. The 
mission comprises f i v e  basic phases: launch, cruise, .  o r b i t  i nse r t i on ,  
mapping, and quarantine. Figures 1-8 and 1-9 i l l u s t r a t e  these phases. 
Launch can occur on any day between August 10 and September 9 dur ing the  
Mars oppor tun i ty  o f  August-September, 1990. Fol lowing separation from the  
upper stage, t he  spacecraft w i l l  enter  t he  c ru i se  phase which extends f o r  
approximately 1 ear th  year. During c r u i s e  up t o  f o u r  t r a j e c t o r y  
c o r r e c t i o n  maneuvers may be required. Tracking and communications 
funct ions are provided by t h e  Deep Space Network (DSN) i n  t h i s  phase and 
throughout the mission. While i n  cruise,  t he  spacecraf t  bus must maintain 
a benign environment f o r  the payload, make p rov i s ion  f o r  instrument 
c a l i b r a t i o n s  as necessary, and ensure t h a t  non-gravi tat ional  accelerat ions 
a re  minimized t o  permit  r e l i a b l e  emphemeris predic t ions.  
The spec i f i ed  i n te rp lane ta ry  t r a j e c t o r y  (Type 11) w i l l  take the  spacecraf t  
s l i g h t l y  outside t h e  o r b i t  o f  Mars. To minimize i n j e c t i o n  energy 
requirements, in-plane inse r t i on  w i l l  be used. This w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  a 
capture o r b i t  w i t h  nominal ly a 4 am ascending node w i t h  a nor th  p o l a r  
approach. The a r r i v a l  date w i l l  be between August 12 and August 30, 
1991. The nominal mission plan c a l l s  f o r  completion o f  the o r b i t  
i n s e r t i o n  phase and the  beginning of  mapping o r b i t  operations i n  
mid-October 1991, before the second conjunct ion period. 
Fol lowing mapping o r b i t  i nse r t i on  the  spacecraft w i l l  be configured f o r  
science mission operations. Again, i n  t h i s  phase, t he  minimizat ion o f  
unmodeled nongrav i ta t ional  accelerat ions i s  an important requirement. A t  
t h e  end of t he  mapping phase i n  October 1993 the  a l t i t u d e  w i l l  be 
increased t o  a s tab le  quarantine o r b i t .  While, formal ly,  t h i s  completes 
t h e  mission, nothing i n  the bus design precludes operations being 
continued i n t o  the  quarantine phase i f  add i t i ona l  useful  s c i e n t i f i c  data 
can be obtained. For t h i s  reason a sun synchronous quarantine o r b i t  w i l l  
be used. 
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0 1.5.1 Launch And Ascent 
Prior t o  l i f t -of f ,  the  spacecraft CPU memories will be loaded w i t h  t h e i r  
f 1 i g h t  load packages, dumped and f i l e  compared using hard-wi red 1 inks 
through the GSE. Command and telemetry links w i l l  be provided t h r o u g h  the 
T-0 umbilical. T h e  spacecraft status a t  l i f t -off  i s  as follows: 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Batteries connected (bus on Orbiter power) 
Command and Telemetry via STS 
A l l  safety related items -SAFE 
Ascent configuration of redundant equipment selected 
RF transmitting elements - OFF 
CPU memories loaded 
CPUs on-line executing Idle Mode software 
CPU Stored Command Table - OFF 
IMUS - ON 
RWAS - ON 
A l l  deployables stowed 
A l l  propulsion items OFF and SAFE 
ASE - ON fo r  communications and power via STS 
Tape Recorder - On 
The spacecraft and i t s  ASE wi l l  be largely quiescent d u r i n g  launch and 
ascent t o  parking o rb i t  w i t h  t h e  CPUs controlling the RWAs running a t  low 
speed t o  avoid damage from the launch loads. 
The communications l i n k  t h r o u g h  the ASE and STS system provides a 2000 bps 
communication capabili ty fo r  transmission of engineering data via 
real-time l i n k  or fo r  recording and playback l a t e r  fo r  analysis a t  3SC and 
JPL. In the launch configuration, the spacecraft poses no hazard t o  the 
Orbiter through f l i g h t  system deployment, o r  i n  the event of an abort ,  
through return and landing operations including the use of secondary or  
contingency s i t e s .  Safety monitoring i s  provided of a l l  c r i t i c a l  
functions i n  the aft-crew compartment. 
1.5.2 On-Orbit And Deployment 
After reaching the desired o r b i t  a l t i t ude ,  the Orbiterls payload bay doors 
w i l l  be opened between 1 and 3 hours a f t e r  l i f t -o f f .  A se r ies  of early 
spacecraft system checks can then be accomplished by the ASE through the 
Orbi ter ' s  standard switch panel. After i n i t i a l  checkout, the spacecraft 
w i l l  be configured i n  a quiescent mode t o  await the s t a r t  of the 
deployment sequence. The RWAs will be switched off and both bat ter ies  
wi l l  be placed on t r i c k l e  charge (C/60 ra te )  on Orbiter power via the 
ASE. 
Data from the spacecraft w i l l  be provided via the ASE f o r  review i n  the 
aft-crew compartment. These data w i  11 be primarily saf ety-related t o  show 
the s ta tus  of a l l  Propellant and Pyrotechnic Subsystem elements. The 
sensing system associated w i t h  these safety-related items wi l l  be 
suf f ic ien t ly  redundant t o  assure unambiguous interpretat ion of the 
spacecraft safety s ta tus .  
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Figure  1-8. Mars Observer Mission Phases - Launch t o  O r b i t  I n s e r t i o n .  
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During parking o rb i t  operation, the Orbiter payload bay wi l l  normally be 
oriented towards the earth. For i n i t i a l i za t ion  of the upper-stage 
guidance system, the Shuttle w i l l  be maneuvered t o  ground-specified 
orientations fo r  short  periods of time and then returned t o  i t s  nominal 
a t t i t ude .  The spacecraft i t se l f  does not require these maneuvers, 
however, the opportunity may be taken t o  t e s t  the IMU concurrently. The 
thermal design of the spacecraft wi l l  accommodate these maneuvers and can 
support the spacecraft i n  t h i s  quiescent s t a t e  fo r  several days i n  the 
event the primary deployment opportunity cannot be sa t i s f ied .  
Based on the achieved Orbiter s ta te  vector, the upper-stage injection b u r n  
orientation and t i m i n g  wi l l  be computed on the ground and relayed t o  the 
Orbiter crew via JSC. A t  the  appropriate time, the Orbiter wi l l  maneuver 
t o  the required upper-stage burn a t t i t ude  and the reference gyros w i l l  be 
in i t i a l i zed .  This reference at t i tude wi l l  be maintained i n  upper stage 
memory f o r  use a f t e r  deployment. If necessary, the reference a t t i t ude  can 
be updated from the POCC and the changes verified by telemetry via the STS 
communications system. 
Prior t o  deployment from the Orbiter payload bay, an autonomous Go/No-Go 
checkout wil l  be in i t ia ted  by a single Standard .Switch Panel Command. 
Using se l f - tes t  routines (SELTS), various state-of-health functions w i l l  
be performed by both CPUs. A t  the conclusion of the checkout, a Go/No-Go 
indication i s  provided t o  the Orbiter general-purpose computer display. 
Following successful completion of the Go/No-Go check, w i t h  verification 
of the on-board indication from the ground, the deployment sequence wil l  
be in i t ia ted  by the f l i g h t  crew. The upper stage w i l l  be armed by comnand 
from the aft-crew compartment; w i t h  the Orbiter i n  a s table  position, the 
crew wi l l  act ivate  the separation device. The Orbiter wi l l  not be 
constrained t o  the injection b u r n  a t t i t ude  fo r  deployment since a f t e r  
i n i t i a l i za t ion  the orientation i s  retained by the upper stage. A 
separation velocity of a t  least  1 f t / sec  w i l l  be imparted t o  the f l i g h t  
system relat ive t o  the Orbiter, and a separation signal provided by the 
Orbiter. An on-board spacecraft timer which s t a r t s  a t  separation wi l l  
act ivate  the Propellant and Pyrotechnics Subsystem when safe 
Orbiter-spacecraft separation has been achieved. Deployment w i l l  occur 
between 45 minutes and 1 hour before upper-stage ignit ion.  The f l i g h t  
system i s  compatible w i t h  earth or  Orbiter shadowing d u r i n g  deployment 
operations. No EVA ac t iv i t i e s  a re  required as part  of the deployment 
sequence; a l l  crew ac t iv i t i e s  can be performed from the aft-crew 
compartment. No spacecraft control i s  required d u r i n g  t h i s  sequence; a l l  
Safe and A r m  functions for  t h e  f l i g h t  system are  performed and verified 
on-board the Orbiter. 
If the deployment i s  aborted for any reason a f t e r  the sequence has s tar ted 
b u t  before separation, the upper-stage ASE w i l l  have the capabili ty t o  
restow the f l i g h t  system i n  a safe condition for  the r e s t  of the Orbiter 
mission i n c l u d i n g  return and landing.  The spacecraft w i l l  provide a 
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p o s i t i v e  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  i t s  deployment sequence has stopped and t h a t  a l l  
propuls ive elements are i n  a safe state.  I n  the  extremely u n l i k e l y  event 
t h a t  i t  i s  not  possible t o  restow the  spacecraf t  o r  t o  conf i rm t h a t  the 
f l i g h t  system i s  i n  a safe state, t he  f l i g h t  system w i l l  be ejected by the  
upper-stage ASE. 
a 
The ASE w i l l  be designed so that  f o l l o w i n g  deployment o f  t he  f l i g h t  system 
it w i l l  n o t  impose any l i m i t a t i o n s  on O r b i t e r  a t t i t u d e  o r  extended mission 
operations. 
Spacecraft a c t i v i a t i o n  w i l l  be performed by an on-board t imer  which s t a r t s  
a t  separation from the O r b i t e r  and ensures t h a t  f o r  t he  minimum separation 
ve loc i t y ,  a safe distance w i l l  have developed before any propuls ion o r  
pyrotechnic elements are activated. 
When the  spacecraft i s  i n  the O r b i t e r  payload bay, a l l  te lemetry and 
command l i n k s  w i l l  be v i a  the  ASE and STS system t o  the  ground. There i s  
no requirment t o  deploy any antenna o r  o the r  appendage on the spacecraft 
u n t i l  a f t e r  separation and act ivat ion.  A f t e r  deployment o f  the f l i g h t  
system from t h e  O r b i t e r  bay, a l l  comnunication from t h e  spacecraft w i l l  be 
d i r e c t l y  t o  the  ground. No spacecraft/STS l i n k s  w i l l  be required. 
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a 2.0 S a f e t y  C r i t i c a l  Spacecraft  Systems 
The f o l l o w i n g  sections provide more d e t a i l e d  discussions o f  subsystems 
t h a t  have been i d e n t i f i e d  a t  phase zero as s a f e t y  c r i t i c a l  during ground 
o r  f l i g h t  operations. A l l  components o f  t h e  spacecraft  and i t ' s  a irborne 
support equipment a r e  located in t h e  cargo bay, t h e r e  a r e  no components i n  
t h e  crew compartment. 
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a 2.1 Communications 
The communications subsystem block diagram i s  shown i n  Figure 2-2 and the  
communications antenna locat ions on the  spacecraf t  a re  shown i n  Figure 
2-1. Antenna coverage i s  provided by a steered high-gain antenna (HGA), a 
f i x e d  medium-gain antenna (MGA) o r  a s e t  o f  wide coverage low-gain 
antennas (LGA), depending on the phase o f  t h e  mission and operat ional  
condi t ions.  The HGA i s  used t o  monitor te lemetry  dur ing t h r u s t e r  f i r i n g ,  
check spacecraf t  a t t i t u d e  p r i o r  t o  and a f t e r  t h r u s t e r  f i r i n g ,  and f o r  
communications w i t h  the  spacecraft dur ing  t h e  mapping phase. During 
maneuvers the  HGA w i l l  be uncaged t o  permi t  motion around one gimbal ax i s  
w h i l e  the  HGA boom remains p a r t l y  stowed. The medium-gain antenna i s  used 
f o r  communications w i t h  the  spacecraft dur ing  the  ou ter  p o r t i o n  o f  t he  
c r u i s e  phase and dur ing  t h e  e a r l y  Mars o r b i t  phase, except dur ing 
maneuvers i n  which case the HGA i s  used. The low-gain antennas are  used 
f rom the  t ime o f  Shu t t l e  separation through the  i nne r  p o r t i o n  o f  t he  
c r u i s e  phase, except f o r  maneuvers. One LGA i s  used t o  t ransmi t  f l i g h t  
system te lemetry  dur ing  the  t ime from s h u t t l e  deployment t o  TOS 
separat ion.  The low-gain antennas are  a l s o  ava i l ab le  throughout the 
miss ion f o r  emergency communications w i t h  t h e  spacecraft,  should t h i s  
become necessary. 
F igure 2-1. Antenna Locations a 
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Figure 2-2. Communications Subsystem Block Diagram. 
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The u p l i n k  signal can include c a r r i e r  only, command modulation, ranging 
modulation, o r  command p l u s  ranging. I n  any event, i t  i s  received by the ~- 
receive section of the transponder, which demodulates the command and 
ranging s ignals  ( i f  present). Each demodulated command baseband i s  sent  
t o  a command detector u n i t ,  which supplies a detected command data stream 
t o  the  Command And Data Handling ( O H )  Subsystem f o r  decoding. 
Demodulated ranging s ignals  are remodulated onto the  transmit c a r r i e r  i n  
the exc i t e r  section of the transponder. During two-way communications, 
the transmit c a r r i e r  frequency i s  coherently related t o  the  u p l i n k  c a r r i e r  
frequency w i t h  an 880 t o  749 ratio.  If no u p l i n k  i s  present, the transmit 
c a r r i e r  i s  derived from an internal auxiliary o s c i l l a t o r  w i t h  the same 
nominal frequency as used i n  two-way operation. For radio science 
measurements, an ultra-stable osc i l l a to r  (pa r t  of the  GFP payload) can be 
switched i n  t o  replace the auxiliary osc i l l a to r .  The downlink signal can 
be modulated by the t u r n  around ranging signal o r  the  telemetry data 
system from the C&DH subsystem or both. The  transponder can be commanded 
a l so  t o  provide a one-way ranging modulation signal instead of two-way 
ranging. A t  any g iven  time, only one of the two transponders has i t s  
exc i t e r  section energized. 
The output from the  energized exci ter  goes through a 3-db h y b r i d  coupler 
which feeds the signal t o  both rf power amplifiers, only one of which i s  
energized, The rf power amplifier provides a 40-watt output t o  an 
i so l a to r  and rf f i l t e r .  
A network of rf t r ans fe r  switches connects the transmit signal t o  the 
selected antenna. The network i s  configured t o  provide e i t h e r  rf power 
amplifier access t o  each of the antennas. For communications while i n  the 
S h u t t l e  o r b i t ,  t he  rf power ampiifier 1 s  by-passed and t h e  transponder 
output i s  switched d i r ec t ly  t o  one of the  low-gain antennas. R f  
c i rcu la tors  a re  used t o  permit simultaneous receive and transmit access t o  
the high-and medium-gain antennas. 
The subsystem i s  controlled by comnands from the C&DH Subsystem. Discrete 
comnands control the transponder operating modes, the command detector b i t  
r a te ,  the transmit switch configuration, and the  on/off s t a tus  of the rf 
power amplifiers. Ser ia l  commands from the  C&DH Subsystem control the 
high-gain antenna pointing. Telemetry points monitor the  operating s ta tus  
and temperatures of the subsystem components. Ser ia l  telemetry data 
provide signal-to-noise r a t i o  (SNR) estimates from the C D U ,  and antenna 
pointing information from the HGA. 
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a 2.2 Command And Data Handling 
The Command And Data Handling (C&DH) Subsystem block diagram is shown in 
Figure 2-3. 
All control functions are accomplished by dual (redundant) on-board 
central processing units (CPUs) each with 64K words of random access 
memory (RAM) and 256 words of read-only memory (ROM) for bootstrapping, a 
controls interface unit (CIU), a controls interface unit annex (CXU), a 
signal conditioning unit (SCU), and four pyrotechnics relay assemblies. 
The CPUs provide both data-processing flexibility and computational 
capability. Each CPU has sufficient RAM for autonomous operation for up 
to 60 days for the Mars Observer mission. The CPU, via the CIU, provides 
all control and computation functions for all modes of attitude 
determination and control, powered flight guidance and navigation, command 
decoding, checking, storage and distribution, power management, failure 
diagnosis (including self-diagnosis), and redundancy switching. Identical 
software packages reside in each CPU with provision for autonomous 
switching between CPUs (via a watchdog timer) in the event of a self-check 
fa1 lure indication. Single-bit error correction and two-bi t  error 
detection are special features o f  the design. 
The CPU Flight software comprises a set of interrelated modules grouped 
into five main categories: Command and Control, Guidance and Navigation, 
Self-Test, Redundancy Management, and Executive. The software may be 
modified or changed out via uplinks. Low level commands are distributed 
by the CIU and CXU; those requiring high-current drive capability are 
conditioned in the SCU, and the Pyrotechnics Relay Assemblies (PRAs). 
The CIU links all command-and-control-elements of the C&DH Subsystem, and 
interconnects the computers with a1 1 other spacecraft components. It 
provides direct hardware access (bypassing the CPU) for certain critical 
commands. Included in the CXU i s  8k words o f  programmable read-only 
memory (PROM) for the safe-system mode firmware, which is CPU 
independent. A redundant crystal-controlled oscillator (RXO) provides a 
5.12-MHz source for all spacecraft timing functions. A controls power 
converter (CPC) provides the necessary tightly regulated power (+lo Vdc) 
for the command and control units. 
To accommodate the data handling requirements, three additional redundant 
blocks are included: the engineering data formatter (EDF) together with 
the GFP payload data subsystem (PDS); the cross-strap unit (XSU); and two 
1.5 x 109 bits capacity Odetics digital tape recorders (DTR). This 
system synchronizes, times, collects, digitizes, multiplexes, formats, 
routes, stores, and plays back science instrument data, command 
verification, CPU memory dump, and payload and spacecraft engineering 
data. The PDS also applies Reed-Solomon error coding to the data streams. 
Four data streams (Science and Engineering 1 and 2, spacecraft bus 
engineering, and spacecraft bus and upper-stage engineering) are input to 
the XSU. By ground command, any one of the four streams can be selected 
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Figure 2-3. C&DH Subsystem Block Diagram. 
26 
f o r  transmission. I n  addi t ion,  a l l  b u t  t h e  S&E-2 stream can be 
simultaneously recorded on e i t h e r  o f  t h e  two DTRs. Recorded data can be 
selected f o r  t ransmission instead o f  rea l - t ime telemetry. The XSU i s  a 
f l e x i b l e  r o u t i n g  c o n t r o l  u n i t  providing, complete in te rchangeab i l i t y  of 
i n p u t  data streams, output  channel, and DTR usage, by ground command. The 
EDF i s  a general-purpose microprocessor-control led te lemetry processor, 
whose output format can be modif ied by command. It c o l l e c t s  engineering 
data and generates packets f o r  the PDS and f o r  d i r e c t  transmission. It i s  
a d e r i v a t i v e  o f  t h e  DMSP/ATN Programable In format ion Processor introduced 
on DMSP i n  1981 and f lown on DMSP Block 50-2 f l i g h t s  F6 and F7. 
Launch by t h e  SSV and i n j e c t i o n  by t h e  TOS necess i ta te new launch-vehicle 
te lemetry  in ter faces.  To save launch mass, the  te lemetry handl ing system 
o f  t h e  OSC TOS has been removed. Before deployment o f  t h e  f l i g h t  system 
from t h e  Orb i ter ,  TOS telemetry and spacecraf t  te lemetry are routed 
separately, v i a  t h e  e l e c t r i c a l  a i rborne support equipment (EASE) i n t o  the  
Payload Data I n t e r l e a v e r  ( P O I )  o f  t h e  SSV. Fol lowing deployment, 
spacecraf t  te lemetry i s  routed from t h e  EDF t o  t h e  te lemetry encoder i n  
t h e  OSC TOS, t h e  m a j o r i t y  vote sequencer (HVS), and i s  in te r leaved w i t h  
TOS telemetry.  The mixed telemetry stream i s  then passed back t o  the  XSU 
f o r  t ransmission t o  t h e  ground by t h e  X-band Telecomnunications Subsystem, 
using an NXT d i r e c t l y  coupled t o  an LGA. 
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a 2.3 Electrical  Power 
The Power Subsystem provides the  required generation, storage, control and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of e lec t r ica l  power f o r  the f l i g h t  system d u r i n g  a l l  phases 
of the Mars Observer mission. T h i s  subsystem includes a photovoltaic 
so l a r  ce l l  array, two nickel-cadmium secondary bat ter ies  ( w i t h  KOH 
electrolyte  pressurized a t  45 psi) ,  power conditioning electronics,  
dis t r ibut ion,  and an automated battery energy management capabili ty.  
Elements of the subsystem a re  connected i n  a d i rec t  energy t ransfer  ( D E T )  
configuration, using solar  array sequential par t ia l  s h u n t  regulation and a 
battery voltage boost-regulator scheme. 
Figure 2-4 presents the Mars Observer (MO) Power Subsystem functional 
block diagram. The Power Subsystem consists of the following components: 
Solar Array (SA) 
Solar Array Drive (SAD) 
Array Drive Electronics (Part o f  SDE) 
Power Supply Electronics (PSE) 
Battery Charge Assembly ( B C A )  
Batteries ( B )  
Battery Reconditioning U n i t  ( B R U )  
Power Converter ( P C )  
Fuse Board U n i t  (FBU) 
The Power Subsystem Electronics (PSE, BCA, PC) accepts power inputs from 
the so la r  array and the batteries (via B V R )  and provides a regulated 
output a t  28 Vdc 52%. The PSE and BCA control the charge current t o  the 
ba t te r ies  t o  w i t h i n  selected limits, and when f u l l  array output power i s  
not required reduces solar  array current output via a redundant shunt 
system. During periods when array power i s  unavailable or i s  
insuf f ic ien t ,  the bat ter ies  w i l l  discharge through the BVR t o  maintain the 
bus a t  the regulated voltage. 
The  BCA passes current from the so la r  array bus  t o  each battery. The 
charge current i s  limited by t h e  mode control (a par t  of the PSE) based on 
the charge ra te  selected by ground command and by the sensed V/T feedback 
signal from the battery. 
A PWM boost regulator supplies energy from a bus  supplied by a l l  the 
ba t te r ies  t o  the 28-volt regulated bus  d u r i n g  eclipse periods o r  when the 
so la r  array oupu t  i s  not adequate t o  supply load current demands. The 
battery bus voltage i s  boosted as required t o  maintain the regulated bus 
a t  28 volts.  A "short" fa i lure  i n  one ce l l  of the 17  c e l l s  can be 
accommodated by the B V R .  
A par t ia l  shunt regulator reduces the current output from the so la r  array 
when f u l l  o u t p u t  i s  n o t  required f o r  satisfying load requirements and f o r  
charging the bat ter ies .  The partial-shunt configuration consists of 18 
switched sections and two parallel l inear  sections. Each section i s  
connected across a s ingle  solar c e l l  c i r c u i t  of 31 ser ies  and 1 5  parallel  
c e l l s .  The shunt operation i s  accomplished by e lec t r ica l ly  mismatching 
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selected por t ions  of the  so lar  c e l l  c i r c u i t s  con t ro l l ed  by the  p a r t i a l  
l i n e a r  shunt sect ion.  The remaining c e l l  c i r c u i t s  are con t ro l l ed  by 
switched par t ia l -shunt  regulators which operate i n  e i t h e r  the  "OFF11 o r  
rON" (saturated)  modes. The binary shunt regulators  are ac t iva ted  as the  
l i n e a r  shunt sect ion approaches i t s  f u l l y  loaded condi t ion.  The Mode 
Control  i s  the con t ro l  element f o r  power regu la t ion  and causes the  
appropr ia te mode t o  be selected. It senses vol tage change on the  28V bus 
and appl ies d r i v e  s ignals  t o  the  appropr ia te regulatory  elements t o  
mainta in  the  28 v o l t s  w i t h i n  the 52% tolerance. 
Fai lure-detect ion c i r c u i t s  continuously monitor the  operat ion o f  the  
charge con t ro l l e rs ,  shunt cont ro l  amp l i f i e rs ,  boost regulator ,  and mode 
con t ro l .  I f  a f a i l u r e  i s  detected, automatic switchover f r o m  the  primary 
t o  backup s ide i s  implemented. E i t h e r  the  pr imary o r  backup func t ion  may 
a l s o  be selected by ground comnand. A l l  automatic switching funct ions can 
be overridden by ground comnand. 
Bat te ry  state-of-charge i s  automat ica l ly  con t ro l l ed  using a C/O - 
augmented V/T l i m i t  technique which u t i l i z e s  Standard Controls Processor 
(SCP) software and Power Subsystem hardware. Bat tery  overcharge i s  
r i go rous l y  con t ro l l ed  t o  minimize ba t te ry  degradation. Bat te ry  c e l l  
recond i t ion ing  w i  11 be performed j u s t  p r i o r  t o  Mars o r b i t  charge/discharge 
cyc les t o  ensure proper c e l l  vol tage balance and maximum ba t te ry  
performance. 
The spacecraf t  receives power from the  O r b i t e r  v i a  the  Power Master U n i t  
(PMU), which i s  a piece o f  EASE mounted on the  TOS cradle.  The power 
requi red when connected t o  the Orb i te r  i s  T8S a t  phase one. 
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a 2.4 Thermal Control 
The Mars Observer thermal design makes maximum use of passive thermal 
control where possible and only resorts t o  the use of act ive thermal 
control elements when necessary. Passive thermal control elements include 
multilayer insulation blankets, radiators,  s t ructural  insulators and 
conductors, tapes, and surface finishes.  Active thermal control elements 
include combinations of Satcom-type Thermal Control Electronics (TCE) 
units ,  louvers, and heaters. 
During pre-launch, conditioned a i r  w i t h i n  the cargo bay w i l l  maintain 
benign average temperature levels ( t h i s  temperature i s  T8D) which the Mars 
Observer Spacecraft wi l l  be compatible w i t h .  After launch, the Orbiters 
cargo bay doors will open no sooner than 1 hour and no l a t e r  than 3 hours 
a f t e r  l i f t o f f .  In the l a t t e r  case, spacecraft component temperatures may 
reach 30°C prior  t o  opening of the cargo bay doors. Temperature r i s e  due 
t o  internal dissipation i n  t h i s  re la t ively warm environment i s  attenuated 
by the thermal capacitance of the spacecraft. Once the cargo bay doors 
a r e  open, the spacecraft is subjected t o  the Orbiter +ZLV orientation as  
well as multiple allowable excursions t o  +Z Solar f o r  30 minutes and t o  +Z 
Deep Space f o r  90 minutes. Spacecraft recovery time from these excursions 
i s  TBD. Thermal analyses of the Mars Observer/Space Shuttle Vehicle (SSV) 
i n  these scenarios have shown t h a t  heater power i s  required t o  maintain 
the  spacecraft a t  the m i n i m u m  allowable temperatures w i t h i n  the SSV 
environment. 
In the event of an abort si tuation and touchdown a t  a primary or  secondary 
landing s i t e ,  a conditioned a i r  purge i s  made available w i t h i n  1 5  minutes, 
providing a means f o r  removal of heat absorbed d u r i n g  SSV reentry. A t  a 
contingency landing s i t e  (where no cooling is  avai lable) ,  the hot tes t  
t rans ien t  temperature reached by any localized par t  of the cargo bay i s  
96" C (per STS83-0425). The spacecraft i s  able t o  withstand the payload 
bay environment, maintaining component temperatures and tank pressures 
w i t h i n  safe limits. 
A major issue i s  the pressure bui ldup  i n  the  fuel tanks due t o  increasing 
temperatures. However, the 5% tank ullage i s  sized t o  permit adequate 
margin f o r  a steady-state temperature of 70" C ,  which i s  well above the 
overall average payload bay l iner temperature d u r i n g  a post-contingency 
landing . 
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a 2.5 Structure,  Cablinq. and Hechanisms 
The structures principal f u n c t i o n  i s  t o  serve as the spacecraft’s physical 
in te r face  w i t h  the launch vehicle and t o  support the other spacecraft 
subsystems. The s t ructure  also externally supports and aligns the payload 
sensors, solar  array,  antennas, and thrusters .  The external conf iguration 
of the  spacecraft i n  i t ’ s  mission mode i s  presented i n  Figure 2-5. The 
Mars Observer launch configuration i s  shown i n  f igure 2-6. 
T h e  general arrangement of the Mars Observer s t ructure  i s  shown i n  Figure 
1-1. As  i n  a l l  the Mars Observer predecessor communications spacecraft 
the  center structure assembly, extending from the top panel (nadir-facing 
panel) t o  the separation plane, i s  the primary load path of the 
spacecraft. This cylindrical  assembly i s  joined t o  the side panels by 
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Figure 2-5. Mars Observer Mission Configuration. 
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means of bulkheads. A t  the base panel, the center s t ructure  changes t o  a 
conical section and terminates i n  a separation r ing  tha t  i s  the interface 
w i t h  the TOS adaptor. The center structure assembly d i rec t ly  supports two 
large propellant tanks w i t h i n  the cylinder. I t  i s  a l so  the support f o r  
other Propulsion Subsystem components t ha t  are  brazed into half-systems i n  
a separate f ix ture  and t h e n  joined t o  each other and t o  the center 
s t ructure  assembly. S t r u t s  extend from the cylinder and bulkheads t o  
internal bipropellant and monopropellant tanks t o  react la te ra l  loads. 
Thrust loads from these tanks are  reacted by shear f i t t i n g s  i n  the 
bulkheads (four bipropellant tanks) and i n  the cylinder (monopropellant 
tanks).  The equipment mounting panels a re  divided in to  halves separated 
by chambers, one of which i s  occupied by the so lar  array boom d u r i n g  
launch. The four equipment mounting panels support the b u l k  of the 
electronic equipment. The velocity and anti-velocity panels a r e  designed 
as  s t ructural  shear panels that  can be readily removed thus a l lowing  
access d u r i n g  a l l  phases of integration and t e s t .  The t o p  panel 
(nadir-facing) and the base panel complete the box s t ructure  and t ransfer  
l a t e ra l  louds t o  the center structure. 
The Mars Observer s t ructure  supports a lO2-kg payload which compares 
favorably w i t h  the 170-kg payload of the Satcom Ku-Band Spacecraft for  
which the structure was originally designed. The Mars Observer payload i s  
located principally on the n a d i r  surface of the spacecraft. Support 
brackets t ha t  extend from sensor attachments t o  s t ructural  "hard pointsg1 
a r e  provided where required for each sensor. The nadir-facing panel i s  
shared by a t t i t ude  reference sensors and pressurant tanks. 
The forward end of the adapter mates w i t h  the separation r ing  and clamp 
band developed f o r  Satcom Ku-Band, and the a f t  end terminates i n  a flange 
containing a bolt  c i r c l e  on a diameter of 90.6 inches. This b o l t  c i r c l e  
i s  the actual s t ructural  interface w i t h  the upper stage. I t  i s  controlled 
by d r i l l  f ixtures  b u i l t  by t h e  upper stage contractor. The f ixtures  are 
"masteredn t o  ensure matching of holes, and f i t  check w i l l  be performed a t  
the  upper stage contractor 's  f a c i l i t y .  
Two separation connectors provide the e lec t r ica l  interface between the 
spacecraft and adapter. T h e  adapter cable i s  actual ly  par t  of the upper 
stage cable assembly w i t h  no additional connector between adapter and 
stage. Both halves of the Separation plane connectors wil l  be procured by 
RCA who wi l l  supply the stage halves t o  the stage contractor. 
No di rec t  mechanical interface exis ts  between the Mars Observer and the 
STS, because the spacecraft i s  t o t a l ly  supported by the upper stage. 
However, the volume, natural frequency, and center of gravity of the 
spacecraft mus t  s a t i s fy  STS constraints. 
The spacecraft on the upper stage i s  oriented horizontally and coaxially 
i n  the STS. The c i r c l e  t ha t  circumscribes the spacecraft has a diameter 
of 136 inches, well w i t h i n  the 180-inch allowable envelope. 
Cantilevered from the upper stage, the spacecraft, on i t s  conical adapter, 
has a fundamental frequency of 16.7 Hz. T h i s  value i s  typical of the 
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cantilevered Satcoms and i s  amply greater  than the 6 Hz minimum dictated 
by the STS control system. The fundamental frequency of the en t i re  cargo 
element (spacecraft ,  upper stage, and ASE) i s  greater than 7 Hz.The weight 
of the cargo element i s  well below the 29,478 kg (65,000 l b )  limit of the 
STS. I t s  location must be chosen t o  meet the c.g. limits of the STS when 
the  mass properties of co-manifested payloads a re  identified.  
2.5.1 Solar Array 
The so lar  array i s  located on one side of the spacecraft t o  accomodate the 
f i e l d s  of view of the radiative coolers of both the PMIRR and VIMS. The 
so la r  panels and t h e i r  associated boom are  stowed d u r i n g  launch against 
the  side of the spacecraft. They are  retained by cables through the 
panels and a t  t h e i r  edges. Figure 2-8 shows the stowed solar  array and 
boom and figure 2-7 shows the solar array res t ra in t .  Release of the so la r  
t 
,CASLE RETRACTION 
CABLE TENS 1 ONER 
PANEL EDGE REST?AINT 
RESTRAINT 0 SHEAR FITTINGS 
TENS IONER 
KCONOARY RESTRAINT 
Figure 2-7. Solar Array Restraint. 
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Figure 2-8. Stowed Solar Array and Boom 
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a r r a y  i s  ef fected by the f i r i n g  o f  redundant cable cut ters .  The s o l a r  
a r r a y  deployment sequence i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  f i g u r e  2-9. Deployment o f  t he  
a r ray  t o  the c ru i se  conf igurat ion i s  i n i t i a t e d  by f i r i n g  the  cable c u t t e r s  
t h a t  sever the  s i x  primary r e s t r a i n t  cables. The three unrestrained 
panels then deploy one a f t e r  the other  by means o f  a passive sequencing 
system, i n t o  a p lanar  array a t  t he  s ide of  t he  spacecraft.  Deployment i s  
energized by springs and damped by viscous dampers a t  each hinge ax i s .  
The elements of  t he  deployment system are i d e n t i c a l  t o  those f l i g h t  proven 
on Satcom Ku-Band. 
2.5.2 Instrument Booms 
The G a m  Ray Spectrometer (GRS) and Magnetometer (MAG) are mounted on 
i d e n t i c a l  booms t h a t  must have t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  be extended and re t rac ted  
f o r  c a l i b r a t i o n  dur ing cruise, re t rac ted  f o r  M O I  burn, and f i n a l l y  
extended f o r  t he  mapping mission. 
Co i l ab le  longeron booms have been chosen f o r  these funct ions because o f  
t h e i r  e x t e n s i o n h e t r a c t i o n  capabi l i ty ,  deployment repea tab i l i t y ,  l i g h t  
weight, s t i f f n e s s ,  and compact stowage. The 22.9 cm (9-inch) diameter 
(c i rcumscr ib ing c i r c l e )  boom used on the Voyager, NOVA, and Dynamics 
Explorer (DE) spacecraft has been selected as the  basel ine f o r  the Mars 
Observer mission. The boom r e t r a c t i o n  technique was used on the S3 and 
So la r  Maximum missions. The booms are s e l f  energiz ing and are released 
from the1 r can1 s te rs  by severing t h e i r  r e s t r a i n t  cables w i t h  redundant 
pyrotechnic cable cut ters .  Deployment energy i s  attenuated by using the 
r e t r a c t i o n  motor t o  l i m i t  t he  rate o f  extension o f  the lanyard attached t o  
t h e  t i p  o f  the boom. Retract ion i s  accomplished by a brushless DC gear 
motor which winds the  lanyard onto a spool. To r e t r a c t  t he  f u l l y  extended 
boom requires a t o r s i o n a l  moment t o  be appl ied t o  the end t o  i n i t i a t e  the 
c o i l i n g  o f  the longerons. T h i s  a c t i o n  i s  e f fec ted  by a b r i d l e  attached t o  
t h e  end p l a t e  which i s  p u l l e d  by t h e  lanyard. 
The magnetometer boom i s  required t o  support two such instruments, one a t  
t h e  t i p  and the  other  near the mid-point. The l a t t e r  instrument w i l l  be 
located outside the cross-section o f  t he  boom. This technique, prev ious ly  
demonstrated on Voyager, al lows t h e  boom t o  be c o i l e d  and compressed i n t o  
i t s  can is te r  as a s ing le  continuous element, because the mid-point 
instrument i s  no t  i n  the way, as i t  would be w i t h  a centered instrument. 
The e x t e r n a l l y  mounted magnetometer i s  supported by a bracket from the  
boom. As t he  boom i s  compressed i n t o  i t s  can is te r  f o r  stowage, the  
bracket passes through a s l o t  i n  the  canis ter ,  and the  instrument i t s e l f  
i s  seated ex te rna l l y .  
Boom length i s  s i x  meters, and i t s  lowest na tu ra l  frequency when 
support ing the  GRS a t  i t s  t i p  i s  0.32-Hz. This i s  w e l l  above the minimum 
requi red by the a t t i t u d e  contro l  system. The s t rength of  t he  booms i s  
ample t o  sustain the t h r u s t  leve ls  (0.015 g) experienced dur ing f i r i n g  of 
t h e  f o u r  22.2N (5- lbf)  ve loc i t y  co r rec t i on  th rus te rs  and by t h e  four  
22.2N b ip rope l l an t  t h rus te rs  used f o r  i n s e r t i o n  i n t o  quarantine o r b i t .  
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Figure 2-10 i l l u s t r a t e s  two different  coilable longeron booms tha t  RCA has 
used t o  deploy instruments from previous spacecraft: the NOVA U.S. Navy 
navigation s a t e l l i t e  and the Dynamics Explorer ( D E )  s c i en t i f i c  s a t e l l i t e .  
The  l a t t e r  boom I s  the baseline for  supporting the GRS and the MAG i n  the 
Mars Observer mission. 
a 
2.5.3 H i q h  Gain Antenna Deployment Mechanisms 
The HGA boom design, i t s  supports and geometry must be such as t o  afford 
the antenna a c lear  f i e ld  of view (FOV)  of Earth d u r i n g  the cruise phase 
and l a t e r  d u r i n g  the mapping orbit  phase. A key requirement i s  t ha t  the 
mapping o rb i t  FOV be c lear  as the Mars Observer moves into and out of 
occultation a t  the Martian limb. Extensive geometry studies involving 
mission date, position i n  the orbi t ,  so la r  array position, and gimbal axes 
orientations were conducted t o  ensure tha t  t h i s  would be the case. 
One output of the studies was the boom length requirement of 3.81 m (150 
inches) i n  the mapping orbi t .  To sa t i s fy  t h i s  length the boom i s  
fabricated i n  two sections joined by a 180' hinge. The inboard boom i s  
hinged t o  the zenith side of the spacecraft, and when f u l l y  deployed i n  
the  mapping o rb i t ,  the ent i re  boom extends i n  the zenith direction. 
Figure 2-9 shows the boom i n  i t s  stowed, cruise and mapping o rb i t  
configurations. 
The antenna i s  attached t o  the gimbal system which i n  t u r n  i s  joined t o  
the outboard end of the outboard boom. During launch the inboard boom i s  
latched t o  the nadir end of the spacecraft s t ructure .  A boom-mounted 
f i t t i n g  i s  pinned t o  a toggle l i n k  t ha t  i s  secured t o  a spacecraft f i t t i n g  
by a pa i r  of pyrotechnic p i n  pullers (Figure 2-11). Actuation o f  e i ther  
p i n  pul ler  w i l l  produce a successful release. The same system was used t o  
release the solar  arrays on RCA's ITOS ser ies  of meteorology sate1 l i t e s .  
Adjustable standoffs s t ab i l i ze  the antenna i t s e l f  d u r i n g  launch. 
Deployment i s  in i t ia ted  i n  t h e  cruise phase by f i r i n g  the p i n  pullers 
securing the outboard boom/gimbal assembly. Redundant laminated negator 
springs, assisted i n i t i a l l y  by short  stroke kickoff springs, provide t h e  
deployment energy, and rotary viscous dampers l i m i t  the angular velocity. 
An end-of-travel latch incorporates a cam feature which eliminates 
backlash. In this position the gimbal system i s  operable, and the antenna 
has a c lear  view of earth dur ing  cruise.  After injection into Mars 
phasing orb i t ,  the large bipropellant engines a re  deactivated, and t h e i r  
loads a re  no longer applied t o  the spacecraft. The inboard boom's 
restraining p i n  pullers a re  f i r e d  and the en t i re  HGA and boom are  rotated 
t o  the zenith position using the same spring/damper/latch design as fo r  
the  mid-point hinge. This assembly i s  the same temperature-control led 
design described previously for  the so la r  array. Rotary waveguide j o i n t s  
a t  the hinges provide RF continuity. 
a 
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Figure 2-10. Nova and Dynamics Explorer Booms. 
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Figure  2-11. HGA Boom Rest ra in t .  
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The HGA boom i s  a tubular graphite/epoxy laminate 6.35 cm (2.5 inches) i n  
diameter x 1.52 mm (.060 inch) wall thickness. The material i s  cured i n  a 
quasi-isotropic pattern t o  approach a zero coefficient of thermal 
expansion. Sensi t ivi ty  t o  thermal dis tor t ion i s  fur ther  reduced by 
enclosing the boom i n  a multilayer insulation blanket. 
2.5.4 SeDaration Clam Band 
The separation clampband, identical t o  tha t  of Satcom Ku-Band, joins the 
spacecraft and upper stage adapter from f ina l  integration u n t i l  a f t e r  
separation from the upper stage i s  commanded. Two semicircular s teel  
bands a re  tensioned by a pair of diametrically opposed bolts t o  apply 
radial  pressure t o  14 V-blocks w h i c h  compress mating rings i n  the 
spacecraft and adapter. Each r ing  has a 15" ramp angle a t  the V-bloc 
interface,  w h i c h  produces an axial  compressive force from the radial 
force. The combination of this ramp angle and 36,030N (8100 l b )  o f  
preload i n  the tensioning bolts produce an axial force great enough t o  not 
only overcome the tension forces produced by spacecraft bending b u t  a lso 
t o  prevent gapping between the mating r i n g s .  
The band halves terminate i n  'Ibathtub" f i t t i n g s  w h i c h  a re  joined by the 
separation bolts. Spherical washers on each bathtub prevent h i g h  bending 
loads from occurring i n  the separation bolt. 
Separation i s  effected by f i r i n g  a bolt  cu t te r  a t  each bol t ,  only one of 
which is  required f o r  successful release. The s t r a in  energy of the band 
combined w i t h  10 springs on the adapter p u l l  the band halves radially 
outward and f ree  of the mated rings. A hard anodize f i n i s h  on the clamped 
surfaces f a c i l i t a t e s  separation of the vee blocks. However, the 
contacting surfaces on the t w o  r i n g s  a re  t reated w i t h  i r r i d i t e  t o  ensure 
ample grounding between the spacecraft and adapter. 
2.5.5 Cabling 
The Mars Observer bus  harness includes a l l  cabling among bus components as 
well as  between bus and GFP, between PDS and GFP body-mounted instruments, 
between N X T  and C D U ,  and between the boom mounted instruments and the 
spacecraft. F l i g h t  harness fabrication will be f u l l y  compliant w i t h  the 
well-established RCA practices i n  design, materials, and component 
selection. Harness design w i l l  be governed by the following documents: 
JPL D-1673 Mars Observer Performance 
Assurance Provisions 
DOD-W-83575A Wiring harness, space vehicle 
design and testing, General 
Specification for  
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MIL-STD-1541 Electromagnetic Compatabi 1 i t y  
Requirements f o r  Space Systems. 
These harness designs w i  11 be developed through the  use o f  computer-aided 
harness analys is  (CAESH). A f te r  i n i t i a l  rou t i ng  i s  determined, t h i s  
program w i l l  de f ine  the  e l e c t r i c a l  performance o f  the  harness i n  terms o f  
resistance, vol tage drops, and power losses. Add i t iona l l y ,  complete mass 
proper t ies  data i s  provided i n  terms o f  bundle sized, weights, i n e r t i a s ,  
and segment CGs. The program works i n  conjunct ion w i t h  RCA's PRIME CAD 
system. 
The Mars Observer harness se t  i s  d iv ided i n t o  the  fo l l ow ing  subassemblies: 
o Bus Harness, which comprises two i n d i v i d u a l  harnesses f o r  improved 
p a r t i t i o n i n g  and i n s t a l l a t i o n .  
o Shunt Harness, very s i m i l a r  t o  t he  Satcom K design. 
o RCS Harness, an ex t rapo la t ion  o f  Satcom K technology t o  r e f l e c t  the  
add i t i ona l  RCS requirements o f  MO. 
o Payload Harness, b u i l t  t o  instrument requirements, which interconnects 
payload elements w i t h  each other and w i t h  bus components. (Note:  the  
Payload Harness w i l l  be provided t o  JPL t o  a l l ow  instrument acceptance 
tes t ing ,  u t i l i z i n g  the  f l i g h t  instrument cables.) 
These harnesses are j o ined  i n  the  spacecraf t  w i t h  the i n te r face  
connectors. This approach improves f i t ,  shortens the  design cycle,  and 
g r e a t l y  f a c i l i t a t e s  debug and t e s t .  A l l  harnesses w i l l  be f i r m l y  
supported by spacecraf t  s t ruc tu re  t o  wi thstand the  launch environment. 
Copper conductors are the basel ine f o r  a l l  harnesses. However, on-going 
t rades w i l l  be performed t o  evaluate the  weight bene f i t s  which might be 
rea l i zed  by using aluminum conductors, a technique present ly  employed on 
several  RCA communications spacecraft. 
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0 2.6 Propulsion 
The Mars Observer Propulsion Subsystem is comprised of a bipropellant 
system for large delta-V maneuvers and a hydrazine system for the Mars 
mapping phase maneuvers. Schematic diagrams of the Mars Observer reaction 
control system are shown in figures 2-12 and 2-13. All active elements i n  
the bipropellant and hydrazine systems are fully redundant. The system 
designs provide for isolation of any failed component by ground command, 
yielding a system with no single point failures. Thruster locations on 
the spacecraft are shown in figure 2-14. All thrusters are functionally 
redundant with latch valve isolation of thruster sets in the unlikely 
event of thruster leakage or failure. Propellant manifolding is designed 
to make all propellant available to any operating thruster set. Subsystem 
design includes redundant heaters, blankets, low emittance tape wrap, and 
thruster thermal protection which preclude any operational constraints due 
to the temperature environment. Long bipropellant system life is ensured 
by operation o f  this propulsion system in the blowdown mode after the Mars 
mapping orbit is achieved. The all-welded RCS construction provides leak 
free, structurally sound systems. The thruster requi rements are we1 1 
within proven steady-state burn and pulse capabilities. 
2.6.1 BiDroDellant Propulsion System 
The bipropellant propulsion equipment consists of eight pressure-fed, 
liquid bipropellant, radiatively cooled, rocket engines and their 
propellant feed, storage, and pressurization systems. Monomethyl 
hydrazine (MMH) is used as fuel and Nitrogen Tetraoxide (N2O4) with 
0.8% of nitrous oxide (NO), designated MON-1, as the oxidizer. The 
bipropellant system is designed to deliver more than 3.69 x 106 N-sec of 
impulse to the Mars Observer spacecraft. 
Helium pressurant is stored at 28.96 MPa in two nominal 0.475111 diameter 
6A1-4-V titanium shell tanks with Kevlar 49 fiber load-bearing overwrap. 
Regulation of the helium is provided by two pressure regulators in series, 
one primary, the other standby. The regulator maintains the tanks at a 
maximum pressure of 1.79 MPa until after the Mars mapping insertion 
maneuver is completed. A pyrovalve then permanently isolates the helium 
supply so that the feed system is operated in a blowdown mode until 
mission completion. Propellants are stored in six spherical 6A14V 
titanium tanks, comprising four 0.564-111 diameter Satcom Ku-Band heritage 
tanks, and two 0.935-m diameter tanks. The latter tanks are mounted in 
the spacecraft center core allocated to the solid apogee motor in Satcom 
Ku-Band. The nominal operating oxidizer to fuel mixture ratio of 1.65 for 
the 490N and 22N bipropellant thrusters permits oxidizer and fuel storage 
in tanks of  equal volumetric capacity. Propellant is fed to the thrusters 
from the 0.94-m diameter tanks which contain propellant management devices 
(PMD) to maintain a gas-free propellant supply at the tank outlet whenever 
outflow is required. Redundant check valves in the pressurant 
distribution manifold isolate the ullage volumes of the two 0.935-m 
diameter tanks to prevent propellant liquid and vapor from migrating up 
the helium lines and intermixing. Two pair of 0.564-m diameter tanks are 0 
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a interconnected on the gas side to eaualize liauid flow from the tanks into 
the 0.935-m diameter tank. Liquid 'transfer between the 0.564-111 diameter 
tanks is inhibited by check valves in the ullage lines. The flow of 
gas-free liquid into the 0.935-m diameter supply tank is ensured by the 
''bubble traps" designed into the 0.564-m diameter tank outlets. During 
thruster firings, the acceleration will settle liquid over the tank 
outlets. Four 490N and four 22N thrusters provide the system impulse 
capability. Nominal system operation is four 490N thrusters firing 
simultaneously for velocity-change burns. Three-axis control during these 
burns is accomplished by on-pulsing the appropriate 22N bipropellant and 
22N hydrazine thrusters. For the trajectory correction maneuvers which 
adjust the arrival conditions at Mars (TCM 2 through 4), the 22N 
bipropellant thrusters are used to provide finer control. These thrusters 
are also used to inject the spacecraft into a sun synchronous, quarantine 
orbit at the end of the mission. 
Positive containment of the pressurant during regulated propulsion system 
inactive periods is accomplished by grouping of parallel-redundant, 
normally-closed and normally-open pyrotechnic valves. Latching solenoid 
valves provide dual seal backup for the bipropellant thruster valves. 
Filters are placed immediately downstream of all pyro valves to trap any 
debris which might contaminate sensitive componments. Service valves 
which seal with redundant caps are located in the liquid and gas manifolds 
to facilitate system testing and launch servicing. Subsystem pressures 
and valve and tank temperature status are telemetered. Positive 
indication of thruster firing is provided by the thruster valve 
temperature readout and on-board accelerometers. 
Thermal control is accomplished with redundant propellant line, tank and 
component heaters. Passive thermal control is also provided by thermal 
blankets and tape wrap on lines and components. Redundant element heaters 
are used on all valves and on the propellant manifolds. The thermal 
control design maintains propellant temperatures within design limits. 
Stainless steel heat shields surround the 490N thrusters to protect the 
spacecraft structures from overheating as a result of direct radiation 
from the hot combustion chamber during burns. 
All joints between tubing, fittings, and components in the continuously 
pressurized portions of the propulsion subsystem are welded by the 
tungsten inert gas (TIG) method. This RCA fabrication technique provides 
proven, leak-free, structurally sound subsystems. 
2.6.2 Hydrazine Propulsion System 
The hydrazine system for Mars Observer is an extension of the propulsion 
subsystems flown to date on more than a dozen RCA Astro-built commercial 
communications satellites. 
Three 0.44-111 diameter spherical tanks contained in the hydrazine system 
operate in a blowdown mode. Each tank contains helium pressurant and 
hydrazine propellant. Low-g propellant positioning is ensured by means of 
surface-tension propellant management devices (PMDs). The propellant load 
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is equally distributed among the three tanks, two of which are manifolded 
to the two redundant sets of attitude control and velocity change 
thrusters. Twelve 0.9N, hydrazine rocket engine assemblies (REAs) provide 
for momentum wheel desaturation and four 22N hydrazine REAs are used for 
3-axis control during delta-V maneuvers and for Mars mapping, orbit-trim 
maneuvers. All hydrazine thrusters have series redundant propellant 
valves. The 0.9N REAs were developed and qualified for the NASA/JPL 
Mariner-Jupiter-Saturn (Voyager) program and are flown on all current 
RCA-built Satcom, Spacenet, GSTAR, DBS, and ASC communications 
satellites. The 22N thrusters have been qualified and flown on Voyager, 
the Global Positioning Satellite, and extensively on the Lockheed P-95 
program. 
Filtration of the propellant to the thrusters in the hydrazine system is 
provided by high-capacity, latch valve inlet filters. Servicing is 
provided by manual propellant and pressurant service valves on each tank. 
Subsystem instrumentation includes two pressure transducers that measure 
delivery pressure to the thrusters. All latch valves have position 
switches for positive valve state determination. The thrusters have 
redundant chamber heaters. Thermocouples on each thruster provide 
telemetry data for ground verification o f  thruster temperature and 
operation. Telemetry signals are also provided for tank, line, and 
thruster valve temperatures. 
400 N BIPROPELLANT THRUSTERS 1-4 
21 N BIPROPELLANT THRUSTERS 5-8 
22 N HYDRAZINE THRUSTERS 9-12 
Figure 2-14. Spacecraft Axis Conventions and Thruster Locations. 
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3.0 Ground SuDDort EauiDment 
This section describes the Ground Support Equipment (GSE) tha t  w i l l  be 
used a t  the launch s i t e  t o  support f inal  bu i ld -up ,  pre-launch checkout, 
and launch operations of the spacecraft. T h i s  GSE f a l l s  into two d i s t inc t  
categories,  the Electrical  Ground Support Equipment (EGSE), and the 
Mechanical Ground Support Equipment (MGSE).  The GSE design, operation and 
heritage a re  discussed f o r  each piece o f  equipment. The aspects o f  GSE 
design and operation tha t  a re  safety c r i t i c a l  are  a lso discussed. The 
EGSE i s  presented i n  section 3.1.  The MGSE i s  presented i n  section 3.2. 
Section 4.0 gives an overview of the conceptual Mars Observer spacecraft 
launch s i t e  ground operations scenario. 
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0 3.1 E l e c t r i c a l  Ground Support Equipment 
The EGSE i s  used t o  perform pre-launch checkout o f  t he  spacecraft (and 
i t ' s  EASE) and t o  perform command and monitor ing of  spacecraft systems 
through the  T-0 umb i l i ca l .  This equipment i s  an a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  e x i s t i n g  
EGSE used f o r  past and present RCA STS launched spacecraft (ASC, Satcom, 
G-Star, and STC-DBS). RCA and NASA have gained a great  deal o f  experience 
i n  working w i t h  t h i s  equipment which w i l l  he lp  t o  minimize the  e f f o r t  
requi red t o  i n teg ra te  t h i s  equipment w i t h  the  KSC ground support system. 
This experience base w i l l  a l so  help t o  minimize EGSE r e l a t e d  safety  issues 
and ground processing delays due t o  EGSE problems. 
3.1.1 Spacecraft Checkout S t a t i o n  (SCS) 
The SCS i s  a computer-driven system t h a t  contains a l l  o f  the t e s t  
equipment necessary t o  i n i t i a t e  spacecraft commands and t o  process 
spacecraf t  telemetry. The SCS a l so  includes t h e  rf s t i m u l i  and measuring 
equipment needed t o  measure the  performance o f  t he  spacecraft rf 
components. The SCS i s  used a t  the launch s i t e  t o  perform i n i t i a l  
spacecraf t  checkout, perform launch pad commanding, perform i n i t i a l  
rehearsals o f  launch pad procedures, and monitor spacecraft safety  and 
hea l th  status.  
F igure 3-1. Spacecraft Checkout Stat ion.  
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T h e  i n i t i a l  spacecraft checkout consists of performing a System Electrical  
Performance Evaluation Test (SEPET) u t i l i z ing  the SCS. This t e s t  i s  an 
abbreviated version of the three SEPETs tha t  are  performed a t  RCA d u r i n g  
the spacecraft level verification phase. The i n i t i a l  SEPET i s  performed 
ear ly  i n  the spacecraft level verification phase, the Final SEPET i s  
performed toward the end of t h i s  phase and just  pr ior  t o  spacecraft 
shipment t o  the launch s i t e ,  and the Thermal Vacuum SEPET i s  performed 
while the spacecraft i s  undergoing thermal vacuum test ing.  These tasks 
will  a l l  be performed by the same SCS w h i c h  wi l l  be used a t  the launch 
s i t e  f o r  the Launch S i t e  SEPET and pre-launch commanding. 
The SCS i s  shown i n  f igure 3-1 and a diagram of the SCS rack layout i s  TBS 
a t  phase one. The f l o o r  space requirements and e lec t r ica l  power 
requirements wil l  a l so  be supplied a t  phase one. The SCS wil l  be 
instal led i n  the Mars Observer Payload Processing Faci l i ty  ( P P F )  two weeks 
pr ior  t o  the s t a r t  of spacecraft PPF operations. T h i s  time i s  required t o  
s e t  up and checkout SCS and data l i n k s  t o  other Launch S i t e  Equipment 
(LSE) and t o  the mission operations network. 
3.1.2 Launch S i t e  EquiDment 
The primary purpose of the LSE i s  t o  provide an interface between the SCS 
and the Mars Observer spacecraft while the spacecraft i s  mated t o  the 
Upper Stage (TOS) i n  the Orbiter cargo bay. Other functions a re  t o  verify 
correct operations of the PPF/KSC interfaces and t o  provide spacecraft 
simulation such tha t  a1 1 TOS-to-spacecraft interfaces can be verified 
pr ior  t o  spacecraft integration w i t h  the TOS. The LSE consist  of four 
separate subsystems: the SCS Interface Equipment (SCSIE), the Remote 
Located Equipment ( R L E ) ,  the  T-0 Umbilical Test Set (TUTS),  and the 
Dynamic Spacecraft Simulator (DSS). 
A block diagram of the  LSE system, shown i n  Figure 3-2, depicts the basic 
interconnections used from the SCS through the RLE t o  the spacecraft. A t  
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) t h e  SCS and CSIE a re  located i n  the PPF.  The 
RLE i s  mounted i n  a GFE cabinet i n  room 104 when the spacecraft i s  i n  the 
VPF,  o r  i n  compartment 10A of the Mobile Launch Platform (MLP) when the 
spacecraft i s  i n  the orbiter bay. The interface between the PPF and VPF 
o r  the MLP consists of a video l i n k  supplied by NASA. I n  addition, the 
PPF supplies MUX-DEMUX equipment a t  both ends t o  handle a variety of 
signals over the l i n k .  The following signals wi l l  pass between the SCSIE 
and R L E  over the l i n k :  
o Telemetry - Two spacecraft baseband telemetry streams 
o Commands - One SCS-generated baseband command i n p u t  t o  the spacecraft 
o Shuttle Interface U n i t  (SIU) and RLE d iscrete  c o m n d s  and bilevel 
s ta tus  telemetry 
Interconnections between the SCSIE, the video l i n k ,  and the R L E  are  made 
via patch panels supplied by KSC. The interface between the R L E  and the 
spacecraft i s  via the T-minus-0 (T-0) umbilical cabling and the SIU, 
located i n  the cradle. As i n  the video l i n k ,  interconnections between the 
RLE and the T-0 umbilical a re  made via patch panels supplied by KSC. The 
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connections between the T-0 umbilical and the SIU are via the Standard 
Mixed Cargo Harness (SMCH) and the cradle harness. 
The TUTS connects to the TOS side of the T-0 umbilical prior to the 
spacecraft being integrated with the Orbiter. It is housed in a portable, 
ruggedized container, operates from 120 Vac, and provides the following 
functions: 
o Tests of SCSIE and RLE operation at RCA or the launch site prior to 
shipment or installation using test cabling. 
o Tests of PPF and RLE operation after installation and connection to KSC 
interfaces, to validate the launch site interfaces. 
o Provides a means of troubleshooting the LSE or cabling and a means of 
training personnel without jeopardizing the spacecraft. 
The DSS tests the TOS-to-spacecraft interface with the S I U  installed in 
the cradle while in the PPF. The DSS functions are housed in the same 
portable container as the TUTS, since they share some of the same 
circuitry and are not used at the same time. The DSS provides the 
following functions: 
o Simulate the spacecraft interface with the TOS. 
o Simulate the RLE interface with the T-0 umbilical. 
o Provide a means of testing the Cradle/SIU interfaces and the Cradle 
test set (Orbiter simulator) functions prior to mating with the 
spacecraft. 
The following sections provide more detailed descriptions of the Mars 
Observer LSE. 
3.1.2.1 SCS Interface EQUiDment (SCSIEL 
The CSIE is housed in a sloped front, single-bay console, as shown in 
Figure 3-3 and is located in close proximity to the SCS cabinets. The 
SCSIE consists of two chassis: a chassis containing front panel displays, 
control switches and internal logic, and signal conditioning circuitry; 
and a data acquisition chassis. The data acquisitiion chassis multiplexes 
CSIE front panel switch commands onto a single output for transmission to 
the RLE for control of both RLE and SIU functions. It also demultiplexes 
analog and bilevel telemetry transmitted from the RLE for presentation on 
front panel displays. The CSIE provides the following functions: 
o Receive spacecraft PCM telemetry from RLE via microwave link and relay 
to the SCS after signal conditioning. 
o Receive spacecraft commands from the SCS, condition the signal, and 
transmit to RLE. 
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Figure 3-3. SCSIE Figure 3-4. RLE 
o Display voltage and current telemetry received from RLE for battery 
charge power supply located in RLE. 
o Receive and display RLE and SIU bilevel status telemetry. 
o Transmit discrete front panel switch commands for RLE and SIU to RLE. 
3.1.2.2 Remote Located Equipment 
The RLE consists of a standard 0.48-meter (19-inch), rack-mountable 
chassis as shown in Figure 3-4, designed for installation in a GFE rack 
cabinet in room 104 at the VPF or compartment 10A at the MLP. The RLE 
consists of three chassis: a chassis containing logic, relays, and signal 
conditioning circuitry; a 10 A battery charge power supply; and a data 
acquisition chassis. The data acquisition equipment multiplexes both 
analog and bilevel telemetry inputs from the RLE and SIU onto a single 
output for transmission to the CSIE. It also receives the discrete front 
panel switch commands generated at the CSIE and demultiplexes the commands 
into parallel relay closure type outputs f o r  control of  RLE or SIU 
functions. The RLE provides the following functions: 
o Receive SIU bilevel status telemetry via the T-0 umbilical and 
transmit to the CSIE. 
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o Receive spacecraf t  baseband te lemetry  f rom SIU v i a  the  T-0 
u m b i l i c a l ,  cond i t i on  the  s ignal ,  and t ransmi t s  t o  CSIE. 
o Mon i to r  ba t te ry  charge power supply vo l tage and current ,  and 
t r a n s m i t  t o  CSIE f o r  d isp lay.  
Receive d i sc re te  f r o n t  panel swi tch commands f rom CSIE f o r  S I U  
con t ro l ,  and t ransmi t  t o  SIU v i a  the  T-0 u m b i l i c a l .  
o 
o Provide up t o  10A o f  b a t t e r y  charge c u r r e n t  t o  the  S I U  v i a  the  T-0 
u m b i l i c a l ,  remotely c o n t r o l l e d  from t h e  CSIE. 
3.1.2.3 T-0 Umbi l i ca l  Test Set  (TUTSL 
The TUTS i s  housed i n  a por tab le  conta iner  f o r  ease o f  t r a n s p o r t  (see 
F igu re  3.5). It mates w i t h  the  TOS s ide  o f  t h e  T-0 umb i l i ca l  and provides 
an accurate s imu la t ion  of t h e  spacecraf t  u m b i l i c a l  in te r faces .  F igure 3-6 
d e p i c t s  t h e  TUTS connected i n  the  LSE KSC t e s t  con f igura t ion .  It i s  
se l f -con ta ined and operates f r o m  120 Vac. I n  conformance w i t h  KSC sa fe ty  
requirements i t  conta ins no i n t e r n a l  power sources ( b a t t e r i e s ) .  A l l  
vo l tages  w i t h i n  the  u n i t  can be turned o f f  by a s i n g l e  f r o n t  panel switch, 
and t h e  u n i t  can be used a t  l e a s t  30 f e e t  from the  Orb i te r .  The TUTS 
prov ides  t h e  fo l l ow ing  funct ions:  
F igure  3-5. DSS/TUTS. 
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o Generate simulated spacecraft PCM telemetry. 
o Decode and display SCS-generated spacecraft commands. 
o Provide res i s t ive  load f o r  battery charge current from RLE 
power supply. 
generated by the RLE f o r  the SIU. 
switches. 
o Provide res i s t ive  load and status indication of discrete  commands 
o Generate simulated SIU bilevel s ta tus  telemetry via f ront  panel 
o Provide t e s t  points f o r  a l l  umbilical signals.  
3.1.2.4 Dynamic Soacecraft Simulator (DSS) 
The DSS i s  housed i n  the same portable container as the TUTS. I t  mates 
w i t h  the TOS/SIU and associated Test Set as shown i n  Figure 3-7. The DSS 
provides the following functions t o  simulate the spacecraft interface w i t h  
the TOS: 
o Generate simulated spacecraft PCM telemetry. 
o Provide t e s t  points f o r  s t r i p  charting commands t o  the spacecraft. 
o Provide a res i s t ive  load t o  simulate the spacecraft load on the SIU 
+28V dc/dc converter. 
o Provide s ta tus  indicators and res i s t ive  loads fo r  TOS timer discrete  
commands t o  the spacecraft. 
o Simulate spacecraft safety talk-back c i r cu i t s  using f r o n t  panel 
switches . 
QSS . 
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a o Provide s imu la t ion  o f  spacecraft separation jumpers. 
The DSS provides the  fo l low ing  func t ions  t o  s imulate the  T-0 umb i l i ca l  
i n t e r f a c e  t o  t h e  TOS: 
o Provide i nd i ca t i ons  o f  SIU b i l e v e l  s ta tus  telemetry. 
o Provide t e s t  po in ts  f o r  monitoring spacecraf t  te lemetry w i t h  an 
osci l loscope. 
o Generate up l i nk  commands t o  spacecraft ( v i a  SIU) using f r o n t  panel 
switches . 
o Provide up t o  10 A o f  ba t te ry  charge cu r ren t  t o  S I U  
o Provide s imu la t ion  o f  d isc re te  commands t o  t h e  SIU using f r o n t  
panel switches. 
3.1.2.5 T-0 Umbi l ica l  Simulator 
TBS a t  Phase One 
3.1.3 St  
This 
f unc 
Faci 
i t  
f i r i  
s t r a  
spac 
f i r i  
.ray Voltage And Bridsewi r e  Checker 
I p iece o f  spec ia l  t e s t  equipment (STE) performs two safety-related 
t i o n s .  These t e s t s  a re  performed i n  the  Electromechanical Test 
l i t y  a t  Cape Canaveral A i r  Force S t a t i o n  (CCAFS) . I n  the  f i r s t  mode, 
i s  connected i n  t u r n  t o  the  var ious spacecraft pyrotechnic device 
ng te rmina ls  v i a  a se lector  switch. This  permits measurement o f  any 
iy o r  induced voltages produced across these te rmina l  wh i l e  o ther  
:ec ra f t  t e s t s  a re  being conducted (such voltages could cause premature 
ng o f  t h e  pyrotechnic devices). 
I n  the  second mode, the  STE i s  connected t o  the  same f i r i n g  terminals v i a  
t h e  se lec to r  switch; however, now the  res is tance across those terminals i s  
measured t o  ensure t h e  i n t e g r i t y  o f  t h e  pyrotechnic devices sa fe ty  
bridgewires. This STE i s  small, b a t t e r y  powered, and housed i n  a rugged 
conta iner .  It incorporates a d i g i t a l  vol tmeter and a d i g i t a l ,  p rec is ion ,  
low-current ohmeter. The design i s  der ived from t h e  cur ren t  TIROS program 
u n i t ,  modif ied f o r  t he  Mars Observer in te r faces .  
3.1.4 Ordnance Device Simulator 
This  STE i s  connected t o  the pyrotechnic device f i r i n g  terminals t o -  
replace t h e  f i r i n g  squibs during t h e  launch s i t e  SEPET. It uses p rec i s ion  
c i r c u i t  breakers t o  simulate the  burnout o f  t h e  squib when s u f f i c i e n t  
cu r ren t  i s  present f o r  s u f f i c i e n t  t ime. This  STE i s  smal1,externally 
powered, and housed i n  a rugged conta iner .  The s e l f - t e s t  mode provides 
v e r i f i c a t i o n  before use. This design i s  der ived from the  cu r ren t  TIROS 
program u n i t .  
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3.1.5 Thruster Simulator 
T h i s  STE i s  connected i n  l i eu  o f  the  thrus te rs  d u r i n g  propulsion system 
and a t t i t u d e  and a r t i cu la t ion  control system t e s t s  t h a t  a r e  conducted as a 
par t  of the  launch s i t e  SEPET. I t  displays and records changes o f  s t a t e  
i n  f i r i n g  c i r c u i t s  t o  allow verif icat ion o f  t h rus t e r  sequences. This STE 
is small, externally powered, and housed i n  a rugged container. The 
des ign  i s  an adaptation of a DMSP u n i t .  
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3.2 Mechanical Ground Support EquiDment 
The MGSE consists of t he  various f i x t u r e s  required t o  handle the  
spacecraf t  a t  the launch site. As w i t h  the EGSE, t he  MGSE i s  an 
a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  e x i s t i n g  designs used on past and present RCA STS launched 
spacecraf t  (ASC, Satcom, 6-Star, and STC-OBS). 
3.2.1 Spacecraf t Workstand 
The spacecraft workstand provides a f i x e d  bench t h a t  pos i t i ons  the body o f  
t h e  spacecraf t  a t  a convenient he ight  f o r  mechanical work a c t i v i t i e s  whi le  
i n  the  PPF. The spacecraft i s  attached t o  t h e  workstand v i a  a separation 
r i n g ,  as shown i n  f i g u r e  3-8. The e x i s t i n g  spacecraf t  workstand from the  
Satcom program w i  11 be used f o r  Mars Observer. 
Figure 3-8 Spacecraft Workstand. 
3.2.2 Spacecraft V e r t i c a l  L i f t i n s  F ix ture 
P r i o r  t o  mating w i t h  the  TOS upper stage, a l l  spacecraft v e r t i c a l  l i f t i n g  
w i l l  be accomplished w i t h  the a i d  of  t he  spacecraf t  V e r t i c a l  L i f t i n g  
F ix ture.  Hardpoints are designed i n t o  the  bus s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  d i r e c t  
l i f t i n g  loads i n t o  t h e  center core. L i f t i n g  i s  accomplished through rods 
t h a t  thread i n t o  t h e  hardpoints and a t tach  t o  an overhead spreader 
suspended from the PPF/HPF bridge cranes. The rods a re  equipped w i t h  b a l l  
j o i n t s  a t  each end t o  avoid bending moments. The Mars Observer program 
w i l l  make use o f  t he  same l i f t i n g  f i x t u r e  t h a t  was used on the Satcom 
Ku-Band program. I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  use a t  t h e  launch s i t e ,  t h i s  f i x t u r e  w i l l  
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a support a1 1 spacecraft vertical  l i f t i n g  operations a t  RCA. 
3.2.3 TOS Adaptor Simulator 
The TOS Adaptor Simulator i s  used t o  provide an interface between the 
spacecraft and the spacecraft workstand (see section 3.2.1) p r i o r  t o  
mating w i t h  the TOS upper stage. This i s  the same adaptor t ha t  will  be 
used a t  RCA t o  interface t h e  spacecraft w i t h  the workstand and t e s t  
f ixtures .  The Adaptor Simulator i s  shown mated t o  the spacecraft 
workstand i n  f igure 3-8. The Adaptor Simulator fo r  Mars Observer will  be 
s imilar  t o  the Satcom equivalent, w i t h  greater  depth t o  provide clearances 
f o r  the oxidizer tank and 110 l b f  thrusters .  
3.2.4 Workhorse Marmon Band 
This Marmon Band i s  a flight-type band tha t  i s  used f o r  handling and t e s t  
only. The actual f l i g h t  band is  used f o r  the TOS upper stage interface 
f i t  check and for  the f ina l  mating of the spacecraft and TOS. 
3.2.5 SDacecraft S h i p p i n s  Container 
An aluminum reusable shippinghtorage container w i  11 be designed fo r  Mars 
Observer spacecraft t ha t  wi l l  consist of a base, a suspension system, and 
a cover. The separation plane between cover and base w i l l  be low t o  
afford maximum access t o  the spacecraft d u r i n g  ins ta l la t ion  and removal. 
The container w i l l  employ casters f o r  mobility and extendable jacks tha t  
w i l l  off-load the casters  dur ing  ins ta l la t ion  and removal operations and 
d u r i n g  storage periods. The suspension system i s  attached t o  the base 
through h i g h l y  damped elastomeric shock absorbers, sized so t ha t  the 
natural frequency of the suspended item i s  s ignif icant ly  less  than the 
f i r s t  mode of the spacecraft. The suspension platform w i l l  contain an 
adapter t h a t  presents an interface t o  the spacecraft which i s  identical t o  
t h a t  of the f l i g h t  TOS adapter. A f l i g h t - t y p e  Marmon band wil l  secure 
t h a t  spacecraft i n  an u p r i g h t  (Nadir panel down) position. No other 
attachments a re  made t o  the spacecraft, t h u s  avoiding redundant load paths 
and/or indeterminate loads. The cover f u l l y  surrounds the spacecraft and 
attaches t o  the base through a bolted, gasketed jo in t .  The cover i s  sized 
t o  provide generous clearance around the spacecraft t o  preclude impacting 
d u r i n g  transportation and inadvertent shock loading. Other features of 
the  container are: 
o Thermostatically controlled heaters and an a i r  conditioning system t o  
maintain temperatures w i t h i n  prescribed limits d u r i n g  transportation. 
o Insulation l i n i n g  the cover and base t o  minimize heat transfer.  
o A nitrogen supply and purge system used dur ing  transportation and 
periods of storage. 
o Shock, temperature, and h u m i d i t y  recorders. 
o Relief valves to maintain pressure equilibrium during temperature or 
altitude transients. 
o Provisions to enable handling by crane or forklift. 
o All materials within the container chosen to maintain cleanroom 
conditions. 
In addition, a separate gasoline powered generator will be supplied to 
power the heaters and air conditioning system during highway 
transportation. 
3.2.6 Prowlsion Subsystem Ground Servicing Equipment 
The propellant loading operation is made up of four phases in the 
following sequence: 
1. Hydrazine transfer from shipping drums to the N@4 vessel. This 
operation does not require the spacecraft and may be performed as a 
parallel operation to pre-loading launch preparations. 
2. NTO loading (Figure 3-9). 
3. N2H4 loading (Figure 3-10). 
4. Pressurant loading (Figure 3-11). 
The propellant load carts that will be used for bipropellant and large 
spacecraft will be designed and built by RCA. The same design philosophy 
and manufacturing processes as used in a flight system will be adhered to 
when constructing the carts. All loading equipment will be tested prior 
to use at the launch facility. Testing will include proof pressure 
testing, and a functional test using NTO, N2H4, and GHE for the 
respective load carts. 
A schematic of the NTO load cart is presented in Figure 3-9. The NTO load 
cart consists of four major subassemblies: 
1. NTO source 
2. Transfer panel subassembly 
3. Molecular sieve 
4. NTO drain tank 
The NTO source is baselined as the government furnished tank in which the 
NTO is supplied by Vicksburg Chemical. The transfer panel contains all 
valves and gauges required for loading operation. The molcular sieve is a 
titanium column containing LZ-Y82 pellets, a synthetic zeolite. The sieve 
serves to remove iron oxides i n  the NTO. The sieve uses a vent line with 
a sight glass to release any gas bubbles which might form both when fluid 
initially enters the load cart manifold and during the NTO loading 
operation. Since the venting gas will contain N02, N2, and NTO fumes, 
it will be routed, using flex lines, to a facility vapor scrubber for 
decontamination. After being filtered, the NTO is loaded into the 
spacecraft via the spacecraft service valves. Propellant gauging during 
both the NTO and N2H4 loading is accomplished by weight. The space- 
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craft will be mounted directly onto the scale platform. The weight will 
be monitored real time during the loading operation. 
Once the propellant tanks are loaded to the predicted requirement, the 
service valves are closed. This method will enable an accuracy ot k0.5 
pound of the entire propellant load. The scale is intrinsically safe for 
National Electrical Code Class I, Division 1, Group C and D location 
enabling it to be used in a hydrazine, monomethylhydrazine, and nitrogen 
tetroxide loading operation. 
The high pressurant load panel is shown schematically in Figure 3-10, is 
used to both load gaseous helium pressurant and conduct the pressurant 
system proof test at the launch site. It utilizes an explosion proof 
pnuematic pump controlled by a high pressure control panel. The panel 
contains all valves and temperature and pressure monitors for the 
pressurant loading. Monitoring is continuous throughout the loading 
operation to avoid overheating the spacecraft pressurant components. 
62 
F i g u r e  3-9. NTO Load C a r t .  
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x 
Figure  3-10. Hydrazine Load Cart. 
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Figure 3-11. Pressurant Load Cart Schematic. 
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0 4.0 Ground ODerations Scenario 
The launch operations sequence i s  shown i n  Figure 4-1. This f i g u r e  shows 
t h e  events asscociated w i t h  the spacecraf t  t h a t  w i l l  take place from the  
t ime  the  spacecraft a r r i v e s  a t  t he  Eastern Test Range (ETR) through t o  
launch. The sequence o f  events occur i n  t h e  fo l l ow ing  f o u r  stages: 
1. Operations a t  t he  Spacecraft Checkout F a c i l i t y  (Payload Processing 
Faci 11 t y )  
2 .  Operations a t  Explosive Safe F a c i l i t i e s  
3.  Operations a t  V e r t i c a l  Processing F a c i l i t y  
4. Operations a t  Launch Complex 
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F i g u r e  4-1. Launch S i t e  Flow. 
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C 
0 4.1 Prelaunch Operations 
The Mars Observer Spacecraft w i l l  be t ransported t o  the  KSC v i a  surface 
c a r r i e r  i n  shipping containers and de l i vered  t o  the  Payload Processing 
F a c i l i t y  (PPF) f o r  payload checkout and assembly. The Ground Support 
Equipment (GSE) f o r  t he  Mars Observer spacecraf t  and the  Airborne Support 
Equipment (ASE) w i l l  be de l ivered v i a  a i r - r i d e  t ruck .  
4.1.1 Payload Processing F a c i l i t y  (PPF) ODerations 
Operations a t  t h i s  f a c i l i t y  are p r i m a r i l y  associated w i t h  the  e l e c t r i c a l  
checkout o f  t he  spacecraft as it a r r i v e s  a t  ETR. The Spacecraft Checkout 
S t a t i o n  (SCS) w i l l  be located a t  t h i s  f a c i l i t y  f o r  a l l  launch s i t e  
operations. 
A c t i v i t i e s  a t  t he  PPF w i l l  include: 
a. Unpack and inspec t  
b. Perform launch s i t e  Standard E l e c t r i c a l  Performance and Evaluation 
c. Perform launch conf igurat ion t e s t  
d. 
e. 
f. 
Test (SEPET) 
Perform squib c i r c u i t  s t ray vol tage t e s t  
Perform spacecraft ba t te ry  capaci ty t e s t  
Perform spacecraft propulsion system pressure t e s t  
During processing a t  t he  PPF, the  STS w i l l  conduct an inspect ion o f  t he  
spacecraf t  f o r  sharp edges/corners/surfaces o r  p ro t rus ions  which may 
damage an EVA crew members s u i t  o r  associated equipment. Where possible, 
c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n  (tape, covers, standard t e f l o n  guard mater ia l ,  etc.) 
w i l l  be implemented. This  inspect ion w i l l  be coordinated w i t h  JPL and 
c o r r e c t i v e  ac t ions  w i l l  be approved by JPL. 
The Mars Observer spacecraft w i l l  then be transported t o  the  Hazardous 
Processing F a c i l i t y  (HPF) 
4.1.2 Payload Ordnance Processing Area Operations 
The Mars Observer ordnance w i  11 a r r i v e  a t  KSC v i a  temperature-control l ed  
a i r - r i d e  van and be de l i vered  t o  the  Eastern Space and M i s s i l e  Center 
(ESMC) cont rac tor  f o r  storage i n  the  payload ordnance processing area 
u n t i l  scheduled f o r  ordnance a c t i v i t i e s .  RCA w i l l  supply KSC approved 
procedures t o  t e s t  and inspect  a l l  ordnance items. A f t e r  approval by the  
KSC Safety Of f i ce ,  these procedures w i l l  be performed i n  the  appropr iate 
payload ordnance processing f a c i l i t y .  The LSSM w i l l  schedule t e s t  dates 
and d e l i v e r y  o f  t he  ordnance t o  the  f a c i l i t y  w i t h  t h e  ESMC contractor .  
4.1.2.2 Electr ical-Mechanical Testinq (EHT) F a c i l i t y  
The Mars Observer bridge-wire resistance checks w i  11 be performed i n  the  
EMT f a c i l i t y .  The ESMC contractor  w i l l  accomplish the  ac tua l  t e s t i n g  o r  
inspect ions based on RCA procedures. 
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4.1.2.3 M i s s i l e  Research Test Bui ld ing (MRTB) 
Ordnance rece iv ing  inspect ions w i l l  be accomplished by RCA i n  the MRTB 
w i t h  ESMC cont rac tor  support. The TOS SRM rece iv ing  inspect ion and co ld 
cond i t ion ing  are a lso  performed i n  t h i s  f a c i l i t y .  
4.1 .3  Hazardous Processing F a c i l i t y  (HPF) 
The payload w i l l  enter  the HPF f o r  payload-unique hazardous operations. 
RCA i s  responsible f o r  the  hazardous operations performed i n  the  HPF 
( a f t e r  procedure approval) and f o r  coord inat ing t e s t  a c t i v i t i e s  and 
requi red support w i t h  the  assigned LSSM. KSC i s  responsible f o r  p rov id ing  
and scheduling the  necessary and agreed-upon support. Hazardous 
operat ions w i l l  on ly  be performed i n  the  presence o f  a sa fe ty  
representat ive.  A c t i v i t i e s  a t  the HPF s h a l l  include: 
a. Unpack and inspect  
b. Weigh spacecraf t  d ry  
c. 
d. Weigh spacecraf t  ( f i n a l ,  wet) 
e. I n s t a l l  ordnance 
Load Propel lants and pressurize w i t h  hel ium t o  f l i g h t  pressure 
The spacecraf t  w i l l  then be given t o  OSC f o r  mating t o  i t s  upper stage. 
4.1.4 V e r t i c a l  Processing F a c i l i t y  (VPF) ODerations 
The payload w i l l  be moved i n to  the  VPF a i r l o c k  using an e l e c t r i c  tug  o r  
the  snatch blocks. A l l  crane operations i n  the  VPF w i l l  be performed by 
KSC cargo i n t e g r a t i o n  contractor  personnel. A f t e r  t ranspor tat ion,  the  
conta iner  i s  cleaned and removed, and the  cargo element w i l l  be moved i n t o  
t h e  h igh  bay f o r  r o t a t i o n  and i n s e r t i o n  i n  the  V e r t i c a l  Payload Handling 
Device (VPHD).  
The Mars Observer/TOS cargo element w i l l  then be i n s t a l l e d  i n t o  the  Cargo 
I n t e g r a t i o n  and T e s t  Equipment (C ITE)  and mechanical and e l e c t r i c a l  
connections w i l l  be made i n  preparat ion f o r  CITE tes t i ng .  
The purpose o f  C I T E  i s  t o  v e r i f y  the  in te r faces  t o  the  Orb i te r .  The 
de ta i l ed  requirements o f  the in ter faces t o  be tested come from 3SC as p a r t  
o f  t he  Operation and Maintenance Requirements Spec i f i ca t ions  (OMRS) F i l e  
11. Test plans and t e s t i n g  o f  the RF and subsystem t e s t  w i l l  be prepared 
by RCA i n  conjunct ion w i t h  NASA and the  KSC cargo i n t e g r a t i o n  contractor .  
I n t e g r a t i o n  and handling a c t i v i t i e s  a t  the  VPF w i l l  be under t h e  o v e r a l l  
management of  NASA and KSC cargo i n t e g r a t i o n  cont rac tor  w i t h  a1 1 
spacecraf t /upper stage owners/contractors p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  t e s t  procedure 
development and implementation. RCA w i l l  be responsible f o r  
spacecraft-unique t e s t i n g  and f o r  coord inat ing t e s t  a c t i v i t i e s  w i t h  the  
LSSM. KSC i s  responsible f o r  prov id ing and scheduling agreed-upon support 
services.  
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0 During the  cargo i n t e g r a t i o n  tes t i ng  w i t h  CITE,  safety con t ro l  and monitor 
func t ions  w i l l  be exercised. A l l  hardwire connections from the  A f t  F l i g h t  
Deck (AFD) and T-0 umbi l i ca ls  w i l l  be v e r i f i e d .  An abbreviated mission 
s imu la t ion  w i l l  inc lude prelaunch and predeployment sequences. 
Data/comnand l i n k s  w i l l  be exercised and v e r i f i e d .  The power t r a n s f e r  
from Orb i te r  t o  payload/carr ier  w i l l  be demonstrated. Power-on and 
power-off s t ray  vol tage t e s t s  w i l l  check f o r  s t ray  voltage. The data w i l l  
be reviewed i n  rea l t ime p r i o r  t o  C I T E  disconnection. A Mars Observer 
end-to-end t e s t  w i t h  the  remote POCC i s  planned t o  be conducted. 
The e n t i r e  cargo w i l l  then be t rans fer red  from the  VPHD i n t o  the  payload 
c a n i s t e r  f o r  t ranspor ta t ion  t o  the pad. Environmental con t ro l  w i l l  be 
provided enroute. The payload GSE w i l l  be t ransported separately by KSC. 
4.1.5 O r b i t e r  Processing F a c i l i t y  (OPF) Operations 
The s h u t t l e  i n t e g r a t i o n  contractor  i s  responsible f o r  a l l  i n s t a l l a t i o n  and 
i n t e g r a t i o n  of the  AFD equipment and o ther  ASE w i t h  the  Orb i te r  a t  the  
OPF. These procedures w i l l  be developed by the  s h u t t l e  i n t e g r a t i o n  
cont rac tor  w i t h  i npu t  from the user. 
4.1.6 Launch Pad Operations 
A t  the  pad, t he  t ranspor te r  w i l l  p o s i t i o n  the  can is te r  a t  ground l e v e l  
below the  Rotat ing Service Structure (RSS) crane. The can is te r  w i l l  be 
ho is ted  t o  the  Payload Changeout Room (PCR) door l e v e l  and locked i n t o  
pos i t i on .  The PCR environmental seals w i l l  be i n f l a t e d ,  and the  space 
between the  can is te r  and PCR doors purged. The PCR and the  can is te r  doors 
w i l l  be opened sequent ia l ly ;  the cargo w i l l  be t rans fer red  ou t  o f  the  
can is te r  by the  Payload Ground Handling Mechanism (PGHM) and i n t o  the  
PCR. The PCR and can is te r  doors w i l l  be closed and the  can is te r  lowered 
and removed. A t ranspor ta t i on  inspect ion o f  t he  cargo w i l l  be performed. 
4.1.7 O r b i t e r  In teqrated Operations 
A f t e r  the  crawler t ranspor te r  moves the  s h u t t l e  t o  the  pad and the  Mobile 
Launch Plat form (MLP) i s  posi t ioned on the  pad, the  RSS w i l l  be ro ta ted  
i n t o  p o s i t i o n  f o r  t r a n s f e r  of t he  cargo i n t o  the  Orb i te r .  The PCR 
environmental seals w i l l  be i n f l a ted ;  t he  c a v i t y  between the  PCR doors and 
the  Orb i te r  cargo bay doors w i l l  be purged, and the  doors opened 
sequent ia l ly .  The cargo w i l l  be i n s t a l l e d  i n  the  Orb i te r  cargo bay by the  
s h u t t l e  i n t e g r a t i o n  cont rac tor  using the  PGHM and secured. 
P r i o r  t o  connecting the  cargo-to-Orbiter e l e c t r i c a l  in te r faces ,  power-of f 
c o n t i n u i t y  and isolation/power-on vol tage t e s t s  w i l l  be run t o  v e r i f y  
proper power system condi t ions.  Then the  i n te r faces  w i l l  be mated and the  
elements w i l l  be powered t o  v e r i f y  t h e  in te r faces .  The t e s t i n g  w i l l  
i nc lude i n t e r f a c e  v e r i f i c a t i o n  and end-to-end tes ts .  
The same ser ies o f  t e s t s  speci f ied i n  paragraph 4.1.5 s h a l l  be repeated on 
the  cargo u n i t  when i t  i s  i n s t a l l e d  i n  the  cargo bay. A t  the  completion 
o f  the  v e r i f i c a t i o n  t e s t i n g  the  f l i g h t  arming plugs w i l l  be i n s t a l l e d ,  and 
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f i n a l  ordnance connections made. Then  the payload GSE will  be moved i n t o  
the PCR, the Orbiter doors closed, and the RSS rotated t o  the launch 
position. 
After the cargo bay doors are closed, the spacecraft bat ter ies  will be 
b r o u g h t  up t o  a f u l l y  charged s t a t e .  The f u l l y  charged s t a t e  will be 
maintained by t r i c k l e  charging. Control fo r  charging will be through the 
T-0 umbilical. The primary power fo r  charging will  be from the Orbiter 
power bus w i t h  a backup t h r o u g h  the T-0 umbilical. 
Shortly before launch, the momentum wheels will  be turned on a t  low 
rotational speed (220 RPM). T h i s  a c t iv i ty  shall  be done by commands 
through the  T-0 umbilicals as controlled by the spacecraft checkout 
s ta t ion  located a t  the PPF.  
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0 4.2 Postlaunch Operations 
When pad access has been granted fo l l ow ing  the  launch, the  payload GSE 
w i l l  be packaged by the  user f o r  removal from the  PCR. KSC w i l l  provide 
t h e  handl ing and t ranspor ta t ion  support necessary t o  re tu rn  the  GSE t o  the  
PPF. 
A t  completion o f  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  the  PPF, RCA w i l l  package ( w i t h  KSC 
assistance i f  required) a l l  mater ia l .  KSC w i l l  provide personnel and 
equipment t o  load the GSE onto t ranspor ta t i on  f o r  re tu rn  t o  the  PPF 
f a c i  1 i t y .  
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0 4.3 Postlandins Operations 
When the Orbiter lands at the KSC Shuttle Landing Facility, a payload bay 
purge of conditioned air will be connected and the Orbiter will be towed 
to the OPF.  After Orbiter safing, the payload bay doors will be opened, 
and the ASE mounted on the TOS cradle will be disconnected, removed, and 
instal led in transportation containers. KSC wi 1 1  transport the equipment 
to a previously designated KSC facility for refurbishment or return it to 
RCA. 
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4.4 Contineency ODerations 
4.4.1 Prelaunch Abort 
Approval f o r  conducting nonscheduled payload a c t i v i t i e s  w i l l  be the  r e s u l t  
of a rea l t ime dec is ion invo lv ing  the  program par t i c i pan ts .  
The payload i s  safed by: 
TBS a t  phase 1 
4.4.2 Return t o  Launch S i t e  Abort 
In t he  event o f  an abor t  landing on KSC, t he  post landing a c t i v i t i e s  w i l l  
be subject  t o  o r b i t e r  contingency operations/planning based on the  nature 
o f  t he  abort .  The nominal planning c a l l s  f o r  services t o  be establ ished 
t o  the  O r b i t e r  w i th in  15 minutes a f t e r  landing. The O r b i t e r  w i l l  then be 
towed t o  The OPF, safed, and payload bay doors opened. The cargo w i l l  be 
removed, safed, and placed i n  the canis ter .  Then i t  w i l l  be taken t o  the  
Vehic le Assembly Bui ld ing,  ro tated t o  the  v e r t i c a l ,  and taken t o  the  VPF 
f o r  cargo i n s t a l l a t i o n  i n t o  the VPHD. The cargo w i l l  be deintegrated and 
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  payloads returned t o  t h e i r  respect ive HPF. 
4.4.3 Secondary and Contingency Landing S i tes  
The o v e r a l l  a c t i v i t i e s  required t o  safe the  Orb i te r ,  remove the  .payload, 
and r e t u r n  the Orb i te r  from a secondary/contingency landing s i t e  are 
ou t l i ned  i n  KTV-PL-0014, “KSC O f f - S i t e  Operations Plan.” 
The payload i s  safed by: 
TBS a t  phase 1 
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5.0 Requirements Matrix 
The Mars Observer Requirements Matrix is shown in figure 5-1. The 
requirements matrix descriptive data can be found on the pages that 
immediately follow figure 5-1. 
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Figure 5-1. Mars Observer Requirements Mat r ix .  
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0 STS PAYLOAD SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
I 
1-219 I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1-212.2 I 
1-213 I 
206 I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
2-209.1 I 
-213 I 
Refer t o  PHR 1 - Arcing o f  exposed-powered e l e c t r i c a l  
c i r c u i t s  and devices o r  payload temperatures grea ter  than 
352OF could cause i g n i t i o n  o f  flammable atmosphere i n  cargo 
bay. 
Refer t o  PHRls  2, 3,  - E l e c t r i c a l  f a u l t s  such as shorts, 
grounds, overvoltages, o r  a rc ing  r e s u l t i n g  i n  damage t o  
STS c i r c u i t r y  o r  malfunctioning o f  e l e c t r i c a l  thermal 
con t ro l  devices causing i g n i t i o n  o f  adjacent O r b i t e r  o r  
payload f lamnable mater ia l .  
Refer t o  PHR 4 - Improper sh ie ld ing  and/or f i l t e r i n g  o f  
harnesses and spacecraft components causing spurious 
non-ionizing rad ia t i on  i n  O r b i t e r  Cargo Bay which 
exceeds l e v e l s  spec i f ied  i n  JSC 07700 Vol. X I V ,  
Attachment 1. 
Refer t o  PHR's 5,6 - Loss o f  heaters which prevent p rope l l an t  
from f reez ing  causing rup ture  o f  containers and/or l i n e s  and 
release o f  hydrazine. 
and/or pressure increases and format ion o f  i g n i t i o n  sources. 
Heater f a i l u r e  causing temperature 
2-208.7 I 
-209.1 I t a i n e r s  causing rupture o f  hardware re leas ing  debr is .  
3-209.3 I Refer t o  PHR 8 - Use o f  flammable mater ia ls  i n  payload 
Refer t o  PHR 7 - Excessive pressure bui ldup o f  sealed con- 
I 
I design o r  improper separation o f  them from i g n i t i o n  
I sources r e s u l t i n g  i n  O r b i t e r  o r  o ther  payload damage. 
I 
3-209.1 I Refer t o  PHR 9 - Use o f  non-compatible mater ia ls  t h a t  
I may reac t  and cause rup ture  o f  p rope l l an t  tanks o r  l i n e s  and/or 
I NiCd ba t te ry  pressure vessel containers. 
I 
I o f  t h e  payload and Orb i ter .  . 
I 
I the  release o f  debris. 
I 
4-205 I Refer t o  PHR 11 - Fa i lu re  o f  e l e c t r i c a l  c i r c u i t r y  r e s u l t i n g  
i n  unsafe condit ions i n  t h e  event o f  a contingency r e t u r n  
4-202.2 I Refer t o  PHR 12  - Fa i lu re  o f  r o t a t i n g  equipment which causes 
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0 STS PAYLOAD SAFETY REOUIREHENTS 
APPLICABILITY DESCRIPTIVE DATA 
M A T R I X  I 
ELEMENT I 
COHME NTS 
................................................................................ 
I 
4-202.2C I Refer t o  PHR 13 - Premature deployment o f  payload appendages 
I closure and/or safe landing o f  t h e  Orb i ter .  
I 
I Refer t o  PHR 14 - Release of  p rope l l an t  from spacecraft tanks 
I and/or l i n e s  due t o  leakage causing corrosion. 
I 
I o f  t h e  p rope l l an t  tanks and/or l i n e s  t h a t  releases debr is 
I o r  p rope l l an t  damaging the  Orb i te r .  S t ruc tu ra l  f a i l u r e  o r  
I e l e c t r i c a l  f a u l t s  of t h e  NiCd c e l l s  causing rupture re leas ing 
I debr is  and/or e lec t ro l y te .  
I 
6-202.28 I Refer t o  PHR 17  - Premature f i r i n g  of  propuls ion subsystem 
I th rus te rs  t h a t  causes c o l l i s i o n  o f  spacecraft w i t h  O r b i t e r  o r  
I release o f  propel lant  i n  payload bay. 
-202.20 I (antennas, s o l a r  arrays, booms) would prevent payload bay door 
5-209.1 
5-208.4 I Refer t o  PHR 15, 16 - S t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e  causing rupture 
-208.5 
I 
I 
I cause release o f  appendages r e s u l t i n g  i n  c o l l i s i o n .  
I 
8-202.2E I 
I Attachment 1 i s  a catastrophic hazard. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
7-21 0 Refer t o  PHR 18 - Premature f i r i n g  o f  i n i t i a t o r s  could 
Refer t o  PHR 19 - Inadvertent operat ion of  payload trans- 
-212.2 I m i t t e r s  i n  excess of  l e v e l s  def ined i n  JSC 07700 Vol. X I V ,  
I 
9-208.1 Refer t o  PHR 20 - Fai lure o f  s t r u c t u r e  o r  appendages may 
-208.2 I cause damage t o  the  Orb i ter .  
-208.3 Refer t o  PHR 10 - Breakage o f  payload s t ruc tu re  due t o  
s t ress corrosion may damage t h e  Orb i te r .  
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6.0 Phase 0 Hazard Reports 
The Phase 0 Hazard Reports have been prepared as ou t l i ned  i n  JSC-l3830A, 
Implementation Procedure f o r  STS Payloads System Safety Requirements, 
Revision A, dated May 16, 1983. The Mars Observer Safety Analysis has 
been performed using the  guidel ines o f  JSC-11123, Space Transportat ion 
System Payload Safety Guidelines Handbook, w i t h  Change 1, dated September, 
1978. The r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  analysis are presented here i n  the  Phase 0 
hazard reports.  
Sect ion 6.1 presents the Phase 0 hazard repor ts  f o r  f l i g h t  operations. 
Sect ion 6.2 presents the Phase 0 hazard repor ts  f o r  ground operations. 
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0 6.1 Flight Payload Hazard Reports 
The Mars Observer Phase 0 Flight Payload Hazard Reports are dispositioned as 
f 01 lows. 
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INO. FLIGHT: 1 
1 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION 
PHASE I I 
PHASE I1  I 
PHASE I11 I 
I 
1 
SUBSYSTEM: I HAZARD GROUP: I DATE : 
HAZARD TITLE: 
E l e c t r i c a l  I F i r e  I October 1986 
I g n i t i o n  o f  Flammable Atmosphere 
STS 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
NHB 1700.7A - 219 I XICATASTROPHIC 
1 ICRITICAL 
Payload i g n i t i o n  o f  flammable atmosphere i n  cargo bay dur ing abor t  and 
contingency landing o f  t h e  STS. 
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. 
2. 
Arc ing o f  exposed powered e l e c t r i c a l  c i r c u i t s  and devices produced by 
making and/or breaking o f  e l e c t r i c a l  c i r c u i t s  o r  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  discharge. 
Payload Temperatures grea ter  than 352OF. 
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY V E R I F I C A T I O N  METHODS: 
STATUS OF VERIFICATION:  
c 
APPROVAL 
PHASE I 
PHASE I1  
PHASE 111 
INO. FLIGHT: 2 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 
PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION I STS 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
SUBSYSTEM: (HAZARD GROUP: I DATE: 
HAZARD TITLE: 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
E l e c t r i c a l  I I October 1986 
Damage t o  STS C i r c u i t r y  
NHB 1700.7A - 213, 206 I ICATASTROPHIC 
I XICRITICAL 
F a u l t  i n  Payload damages STS c i r c u i t r y .  Hazard i s  c r i t i c a l  s ince 
payload bay power i s  fused by Orbiter. 
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. I n t e r n a l  payload e l e c t r i c a l  f a u l t s  such as shorts, grounds, overvoltages, 
e tc .  t h a t  could cause overloading o f  STS c i r c u i t r y .  
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY VERIFICATION METHODS: 
STATUS OF VERIFICATION:  
INO. FLIGHT: 3 
I 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
APPROVAL PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION 
PHASE I 
PHASE I 1  
PHASE I11 I 
I 
F i r e  I October 1986 
1 
SUBSYSTEM: I HAZARD GROUP: I DATE : 
HAZARD TITLE: Thermal I g n i t i o n  Source 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
E l  e c t r i  c a l  I 
NHB 1700.7A - 213 I XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
STS 
Generating s u f f i c i e n t  heat f rom payload e l e c t r i c a l  c i r c u i t s  t o  i g n i t e  
ad jacent  o r b i t e r  o r  payload flammable mater ia l .  
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. I n t e r n a l  shor ts  o r  a rc ing  i n  e l e c t r i c a l  c i r c u i t r y .  
2. Mal funct ion o f  e l e c t r i c a l  thermal con t ro l  devices. 
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY V E R I F I C A T I O N  METHODS: 
STATUS OF VERIFICATION: 
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INO. FLIGHT: 4 
I 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
I 
I 
SUBSYSTEM: IHAZARD GROUP: I DATE : 
HAZARD TITLE: 
E l  e c t r i  ca 1 I Radiat ion I October 1986 
S u s c e p t i b i l i t y  To Electromagnetic Radiat ion 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: /HAZARD CATEGORY: 
NHB 1700.7A - 212.2 I XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
Spurious non- ioniz ing r a d i a t i o n  from the  Orb i te r ,  copassenger payloads, o r  the  
MO spacecraf t  wh i le  i n  O r b i t e r  Cargo Bay exceeding l eve l s  spec i f ied  i n  JSC 
07700 Vol. X I V ,  Attachment 1 dur ing normal payload operat ion.  
(NOTE: Radiat ion from antennas i s  covered i n  Payload Hazard Report 19, 
"Excess Transmit ter  Radiat ion.") 
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. Radiat ion o f  energy from the  O r b i t e r ,  copassenger payloads, o r  the  
spacecraf t  components which adversely e f f e c t s  the  MO spacecraf t  due t o  
improper sh ie ld ing  o r  improper f i l t e r i n g  o f  the  MO spacecraf t  components. 
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY V E R I F I C A T I O N  METHODS: 
STATUS OF VERIF ICATION:  
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION I STS 
~~ 
PHASE II I I 
PHASE I11 I I 
84 
(NO. FLIGHT: 5 
I 
1 
I I 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
SUBSYSTEM: IHAZARD GROUP: Temperature IDATE: 
HAZARD TITLE: Temperature Extremes (Low) 
Environmental Control I Extremes I October 1986 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
NHB 1700.7A - 209.la, 213 I XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
Low temperature extremes could r e s u l t  i n  t h e  release o f  hazardous mater ia l  
(p rope l lan t ) .  
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1 .  Loss o f  heaters t h a t  could a l low f reez ing  o f  payload f l u i d s  t o  such an 
ex ten t  t h a t  containers and/or l i n e s  could rupture.  
ISiies sre the m l y  possible Stem. 
Propel lant  tanks o r  
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY VERIFICATION METHODS: 
STATUS OF VERIF ICATION:  
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION I STS 
PHASE I I 
PHASE I 1  I 
PHASE I11 I 
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INO. FLIGHT: 6 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 
APPROVAL 
PHASE I 
PHASE I1 
I 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION I STS 
I 
I 
I 
SUBSYSTEM: IHAZARD GROUP: Temperature I DATE: 
Environmental Control  I Extremes I October 1986 
I I 
HAZARD TITLE: Temperature Extremes (High) 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
NHB 1700.7A - 209.la, 213 I XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
High temperature extremes could cause the  release o f  hazardous mater ia l  
(p rope l l an t )  or t he  format ion o f  i g n i t i o n  sources 
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. F a i l u r e  o f  a heater i n  On pos i t i on  t h a t  could cause h igh temperatures, 
r e s u l t i n g  i n  propuls ion system pressure increases o r  t he  format ion o f  
i g n i t i o n  sources. 
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY V E R I F I C A T I O N  METHODS: 
STATUS OF VERIF ICATION:  
(NO. FLIGHT: 7 
I 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
1 
I I 
SUBSYSTEM: IHAZARD GROUP: I DATE : 
HAZARD TITLE: Rupture o f  Sealed Containers During Ascent o r  Descent 
Environmental Control  I Contamination1 October 1986 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
NHB 1700.7A - 208.7, 209.1 I ICATASTROPHIC 
I XICRITICAL 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
Rupture o f  sealed containers re leas ing debr is .  
RWA's and small  re lays  i n t e r n a l  t o  subsystem boxes. 
The sealed containers a re  the  
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. 
2. Undetected f laws o r  cracks. 
3. F i i y s i i a i  damye during handl ing.  
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
Excessive pressure bui ldup i n  sealed containers.  
SAFETY VERIF ICATION METHODS: 
STATUS OF VERIFICATION:  
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION I STS 
PHASE I I 
PHASE I1 I 
PHASE 111 I 
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!NO. FLIGHT: 8 
I 
I 
I 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
SUBSYSTEM: IHAZARD GROUP: 1 DATE : 
HAZARD TITLE: Flammabi l i ty  o f  Mater ia ls  
Mater ia ls  I F i r e  I October 1986 
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION 
PHASE I I 
PHASE 11 I 
PHASE 111 I 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
NHB 1700.7A - 209.3 I XICATASTROPHIC 
STS 
I ICRITICAL 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
O r b i t e r  Damage o r  o ther  payload damage due t o  i g n i t i o n  o f  flammable mater ia ls .  
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. 
2. Improper separat ion o f  flammable mater ia ls  f rom p o t e n t i a l  i g n i t i o n  sources. 
nAzi\Rg CONTROLS: 
Use o f  flammable mater ia ls  i n  payload design. 
SAFETY V E R I F I C A T I O N  METHODS: 
STATUS OF V E R I F I C A T I O N :  
(NO. FLIGHT: 9 
PAY LOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 
I 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
I 
SUBSYSTEM: IHAZARD GROUP: F i r e  I DATE : 
Mater ia ls  I Contamination1 October 1986 
I .Corros i on I 
HAZARD TITLE: Hazardous Mater ia ls  Compat ib i l i t y  
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: (HAZARD CATEGORY: 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
NHB 1700.7A - 209.1 ( XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
Reaction o f  conta in ing mater ia ls  wi th  hazardous f l u i d s ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y  hydrazine 
tanks and NiCd b a t t e r y  pressure vessel containers.  
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. Use o f  non-compatible mater ia ls  t h a t  may react .  
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY VERIFICATION METHODS: 
STATUS OF V E R I F I C A T I O N :  
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION I STS 
PHASE I I I 
PHASE I1 I I 
PHASE 111 1 1 
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INO. FLIGHT: 10 
I 
I 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
SUBSYSTEM: IHAZARD GROUP: I DATE : 
St ruc tures  I Corrosion I October 1986 
I I 
HAZARD TITLE: Stress Corrosion S t ruc tu ra l  Weakening 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
NHB 1700.7A - 208.3 I XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
Damage t o  t h e  O r b i t e r  due t o  breaking o f  s t r u c t u r a l  p a r t s  o f  t h e  payload. 
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1 .  Stress Corrosion of payload s t r u c t u r a l  ma te r ia l s  weakening them past  t h e i r  
des ign l i m i t s .  
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY V E R I F I C A T I O N  METHODS: 
STATUS OF V E R I F I C A T I O N :  
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION I STS 
PHASE I 
PHASE I 1  
PHASE I11 
INO. FLIGHT: 11 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 
I 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
I 
I I 
SUBSYSTEM: IHAZARD GROUP: Loss o f  I DATE : 
HAZARD TITLE: Contingency Return Considerations 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
Mechanical I O r b i t e r  Entry  C a p a b i l i t y  I October 1986 
NHB 1700.7A - 205 I XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
Spacecraft f a i l u r e  p r i o r  t o  o r  during contingency r e t u r n  o r  abor t  causing 
damage t o  the  Orb i te r .  
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. 
2. 
3.  Possible h igh landing loads. 
Spacecraft may be i n  deployment mode con f igu ra t i on  and otherwise 
e l e c t r i c a l l y  unsafe. 
Bui iaup of  temperature w i t h i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  bay. 
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY VERIF ICATION METHODS: 
STATUS OF V E R I F I C A T I O N :  
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION I STS 
PHASE I I I 
PHASE I 1  I I 
PHASE 111 I I 
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INO. FLIGHT: 12 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION 
PHASE I I 
PHASE I1 I 
PHASE I11 I 
I 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
STS 
I 
I 
SUBSYSTEM: IHAZARD GROUP: I DATE : 
HAZARD TITLE: Rotat ing Equipment 
Mechanical I C o l l i s i o n  I October 1986 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
NHB 1700.7A - 202.2 I XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
- 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
Debris from r o t a t i n g  equipment f a i l u r e  could damage Orbi ter .  
gyro assemblies are poss ib le  r o t a t i n g  equipment t h a t  could f a i l .  
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. 
The RWA's and 
F a i l u r e  o f  r o t a t i n g  equipment ( reac t i on  wheels and/or gyro assemblies) 
du r ing  STS launch o r  deployment operations re leas ing debr is.  
HAZARD C O N l R O L S :  
SAFETY V E R I F I C A T I O N  METHODS: 
STATUS OF VERIF ICATION:  
92 
INO. FLIGHT: 13 
I 
I 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
SUBSYSTEM: IHAZARD GROUP: I DATE : 
Mechanical I C o l l i s i o n  I October 1986 
PHASE I 1  
PHASE 111 
I '  I 
HAZARD TITLE: Premature Deployment 
I 
I 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
NHB 1700.7A - 202.2C, 202.2D I XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
Premature deployment o f  spacecraf t  appendages t h a t  may prevent payload bay 
door c losure  and/or safe landing o f  Orb i te r .  
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. Premature release o f  s o l a r  panel r e s t r a i n t  bands. 
2. Premature deployment o f  t h e  high gain antenna. 
3.  Premature deployment o f  an instrument boom. 
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY V E R I F I C A T I O N  METHODS: 
STATUS OF V E R I F I C A T I O N :  
INO. FLIGHT: 14 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 
I 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
I 
F i r e  I 
SUBSYSTEM: Pressure I HAZARD GROUP: Contamination I DATE: 
HAZARD TITLE: 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
Systems I Corrosion I October 1986 
Leakage o f  Hazardous F lu ids  
NHB 1700.7A - 209.la I XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
Release o f  p rope l l an t  (HON-1, MHH, N2H4) from spacecraf t 's  propuls ion 
subsystem damaging the  Orb i te r .  
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. Leakage o f  p rope l l an t  f rom seals, valves, o r  connections due t o  mater ia l  
defect ,  degradation, undetected damage, o r  weld f a i l u r e .  
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY V E R I F I C A T I O N  METHODS: 
STATUS OF VERIF ICATION:  . 
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION I STS 
PHASE I1 I I 
PHASE 111 I I 
94 
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
INO. FLIGHT: 15 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 
I 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
I 
Corrosion I October 1986 
F i r e  I 
SUBSYSTEM: Pressure IHAZARD GROUP: ContaminationlDATE: 
HAZARD TITLE: Rupture o f  Pressure Vessels 
Systems 1 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: \HAZARD CATEGORY: 
NHB 1700.7A - 208.4, 208.5 I XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
Rupture of  pressure vessels releasing debr is  o r  p rope l l an t  (MON-1, MMH, 
N2H4) i n t o  t h e  payload bay t h a t  could damage the  Orb i ter .  
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. S t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e  o f  propel lant  tanks o r  l i n e s  due t o  ma te r ia l  defects, 
degradation, undetected damage, weld f a i l u r e ,  o r  i n s u f f i c i e n t  f a c t o r  o f  
sa fe ty  i n  t h e  design causing rupture rupture of  tanks and/or l i n e s  which 
could r e s u l t  i n  the  release of propel lant .  
SAFETY VERIFICATION METHODS: 
STATUS OF V E R I F I C A T I O N :  
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION I STS 
PHASE I 1 I 
PHASE I1  I I 
PHASE 111 I I 
95 
I NO. FLIGHT: GROUND  16 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT 
UAU: mars OD server 3t: u 
I I 
HAZARD TITLE: Rupture o f  NiCd Bat te r ies  
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION 
PHASE I 1 
PHASE I 1  I 
PHASE 111 I 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
NHB 1700.7A - 208.4, 208.5 I XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
STS 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
Rupture o f  t he  NiCd b a t t e r y  c e l l s ,  re leas ing debr is  and/or e l e c t r o l y t e .  
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. S t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  NiCd c e l l s .  
2. Overpressur izat ion caused by i n t e r n a l  o r  ex te rna l  shor t ,  c e l l  reversa l ,  
overcharging, temperature extremes, o r  b a t t e r y  p l a t e  i n s u l a t o r  f a i l u r e .  
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY VERIF ICATION METHODS: 
STATUS OF VERIF ICATION:  
JNO. FLIGHT: 17 
I 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
I 
SUBSYSTEM: I HAZARD GROUP: 1 DATE : 
Propul s i  on I C o l l i s i o n  I October 1986 
I I 
HAZARD TITLE: Propulsion Subsystem 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
NHB 1700.7A - 202.2b(l), 209-la, 213 I XICATASTROPHIC 
1 ICRITICAL 
1. 
2. Heating o f  p r o p e l l a n t  t o  hazardous temperature l eve l s .  
Premature f i r i n g  o f  t h e  propuls ion subsystem th rus te rs .  
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. 
2. 
F a i l u r e  o f  t he  propuls ion subsystem o r  inadver tent  comnanding t h a t  al lows 
f l o w  o f  p r o p e l l a n t  t o  the  thrusters .  
Relay f a i l u r e  causing a l a t c h  valve c o i l  t o  be cont inuously energized. 
This would heat t he  l a t c h  valves and r a i s e  the  temperature o f  t he  
p r o p e l l a n t  adjacent t o  them. 
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY V E R I F I C A T I O N  METHODS: 
STATUS OF VERIF ICATION:  
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION I STS 
PHASE I I 1 
PHASE I1  I I 
PHASE 111 I I 
97 
JNO. FLIGHT: 18 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 
I 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
I 
I 
SUBSYSTEM: IHAZARD GROUP: I DATE: 
HAZARD TITLE: Inadver tent  F i r i n g  of  I n i t i a t o r s  
Pyrotechnics I C o l l i s i o n  I October 1986 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
NHB 1700.7A - 210 I XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
F i r i n g  o f  i n i t i a t o r s  could cause inadver tent  re lease o f  r e s t r a i n t s  on 
appendages, causing c o l l i s i o n  of the spacecraf t  w i th  t h e  Orb i te r .  
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. Premature f i r i n g  o f  i n i t i a t o r  due t o  s t r a y  E M I .  
2. F a i l u r e  i n  f i r e  c o n t r o l  c i r c u i t r y .  
3 .  Explosion o f  i n i t i a t o r .  
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY V E R I F I C A T I O N  METHODS: 
STATUS OF VERIFICATION:  
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION I STS 
PHASE I I I 
PHASE I1 I I 
PHASE 111 I I 
98 
INO. FLIGHT: 19 
I 
I 
I 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer ]PHASE: 0 
SUBSYSTEM: IHAZARD GROUP: I DATE : 
HAZARD TITLE: Exc'ess Transmi t ter  i a d i a t i o n  
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
Communications I Radiat ion I October 1986 
NHB 1700.7A - 202.2e, 212.2 I XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
Exposure o f  t h e  O r b i t e r  t o  RF r a d i a t i o n  i n  excess o f  JSC 07700 Vol. X I V .  
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. Inadver tent  operat ion o f  RF t ransmi t te rs  causing r a d i a t i o n  f rom 
t r a n s m i t t e r s  i n  excess o f  permit ted l eve l s .  
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY VERIFICATION METHODS: 
STATUS OF VERIFICATION: 
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION I STS 
PHASE I I I 
PHASE SI I I 
INO. FLIGHT: 20 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 
I 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
I 
I 
SUBSYSTEM: IHAZARD GROUP: I DATE : 
HAZARD TITLE: S t r u c t u r a l  Fa i l u res  
Structures I C o l l i s i o n  I October 7986 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
NHB 1700.7A - 208.1, 208.2, 208.3 I XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
F a i l u r e  o f  t he  primary spacecraf t  s t ruc tu re  o r  f a i l u r e  o f  c r i t i c a l  
appendages causing movement of  t he  payload o r  appendages i n  the  
o r b i t e r  bay which may cause o r b i t e r  damage. 
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. I n s u f f i c i e n t  f a c t o r  o f  safety  
2. Fracture growth 
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY VERIF ICATION METHODS: 
STATUS OF VERIFICATION:  
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION I STS 
PHASE I I I 
PHASE I1 I 1 
PHASE 111 I I 
100 
6.2 Ground Pavload Hazard Reports 
The Mars Observer Phase 0 Ground Payload Hazard Reports are dispositioned as 
f 01 1 ows . 
Table o f  Contents 
PHR# 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1 
8 
9 
10 
1 1  
Su bsvs t em 
El ectri cal 
Structures 
Propulsion. 
Materials 
Pyrotechnics 
Communications 
Electrical 
Pyro./Propulsion 
Pressure Sys. 
Propulsion 
Mechanical 
Hazard Title 
Electrical Hazards (Electric Shock) 
Failure of Lifting and/or Handling Equipment 
Inadvertent Release of Propellant Due to 
Loss of Habitable/Breathable Atmosphere 
Inadvertent Ignition o f  Pyrotechnics 
Hazardous Levels o f  Radiation 
Ignition o f  Flammable Materials 
Postlanding Operations - Aborted Mission 
NiCd Batteries Hazards 
Inadvertent Firing or Leakage Through 
Thrusters 
Rotating Equipment 
During Ground Operations 
Lea kage/Rupt u re 
Page 
102 
1 a3 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
1 1 1  
112 
101 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT 
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION 
PHASE I 
PHASE I1  
PHASE I11 
!NO. FLIGHT 
I GROUND: 1 
STS 
I 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
I 
I 
SUBSYSTEM: IHAZARD GROUP: I DATE: 
HAZARD TITLE: E l e c t r i c a l  Hazards 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
E 1 e c t r i  c a l  I E l e c t r i c a l  Shock I October 1986 
KHB 1700.7A - 4.3.2 I XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
Po ten t ia l  e l e c t r i c a l  shock hazard t o  operat ing personnel. 
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. Inadequate f a u l t  p ro tec t ion /de tec t ion  i n  the  Spacecraft Checkout S ta t i on  
(SCS) Design, o ther  GSE, o r  t he  spacecraft.  
2. Improper i n s t a l l a t i o n ,  assembly, operator  e r ro r ,  e tc .  
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY VERIF ICATION METHODS: 
STATUS OF V E R I F I C A T I O N :  
102 
INO. FLIGHT: 
I 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 2 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
I 
SUBSYSTEM: IHAZARD GROUP: C o l l i s i o n  IDATE: 
Hechan i ca 1 I I n j u r y  I October 1986 
I I 
HAZARD TITLE: 
F a i l u r e  of  L i f t i n g  and/or Handlincj Equipment During Ground Operations 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
KHB 1700.7A - 4.5.1 I XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
Inadver tent  dropping o f  Spacecraft could r e s u l t  i n  equipment damage and/or 
personnel i n j u r y  dur ing handl ing operations. 
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. 
2. Improper r i gg ing  and/or procedures i n  using 
Handling equipment f a i l u r e  due t o  i n s u f f i c i e n t  f a c t o r  o f  safety.  
handl ing equipment. 
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY VERIF ICATION METHODS: 
STATUS OF V E R I F I C A T I O N :  
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION I STS 
PHASE I I 1 
PHASE I 1  I I 
PHASE 111 I I 
103 
1NO. FLIGHT: 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 3 
PHASE I 
I 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
I 
I 
I 
SUBSYSTEM: I HAZARD GROUP: I n j u r y  I DATE : 
Propul s i  on I Contamination I October 1986 
I 11 lness I 
HAZARD TITLE: 
Release o f  Propel lant  
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
KHB 1700.7A - 4.3.3, 4.3.7 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
I XICATASTR 
1 I C R I T I C A  
OPHIC 
L 
Rupture and/or leakage o f  the propulsion subsystem o r  propuls ion GSE tanks 
and/or l i n e s  re leas ing propellant/pressurant (MON-1, MMH, N2H4, Helium) 
which could cause personnel i n j u r y  o r  i l l n e s s  from debr is o r  deplet ion o f  
breathable atmosphere. 
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. 
2. 
3. S t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e  of  tanks and/or l i n e s  o f  t h e  propuls ion 
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
Leakage o f  p rope l l an t  through propulsion subsystem/propulsion GSE valves 
o r  connections. 
F l u i d  s p i l l s  due t o  improper loading procedures. 
subsystem/propulsion GSE. 0 
SAFETY VERIF ICATION METHODS: 
STATUS OF VERIF ICATION:  
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION I STS 
104 
INO. FLIGHT: 
I 
I 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 4 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
SUBSYSTEM: I HAZARD GROUP: I DATE: 
Mater ia ls  I Contamination I October 1986 
I I 
HAZARD TITLE: Loss o f  Habitable/Breathable Atmosphere 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
KHB 1700.7A - 4.4.2.2 I XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
I n h a l a t i o n  o r  inges t ion  o f  be ry l l i um o r  o the r  t o x i c  fumes and/or p a r t i c u l a t e s  
leading t o  personnel i l l n e s s .  
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. Welding, cu t t i ng ,  o r  machining operations performed on b e r y l l i u m  
components. 
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY VERIF ICATION METHODS: 
STATUS OF VERIF ICATION:  
APPROVAL 1 PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION 1 STS 
PHASE I1 I I 
PHASE 111 I I 
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INO. FLIGHT: 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 5 a I 
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION 
PHASE I I 
I PHASE I1 
I 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
SUBSYSTEM: IHAZARD GROUP: I n j u r y  I DATE : 
HAZARD TITLE: 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
I 
I 
Pyrotechnic I F i r e  I October 1986 
Inadver tent  I g n i t i o n  o f  Pyrotechnics 
KHB 1700.7A - 4.3.5.2,  4.3.5.3, 4 .3 .5 .4  I XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
STS 
Inadver tent  i g n i t i o n  o f  ordnance could r e s u l t  i n  equipment damage, personnel 
i n j u r y  o r  f i r e .  
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1.  
2.  
3 .  
4 .  Electromagnetic In te r fe rence ( E M I )  f rom spacecraf t  o r  i n  the  v i c i n i t y  o f  
Inadver tent  app l i ca t i on  o f  power t o  €ED'S due t o  improper i n s t a l l a t i o n /  
handling, inadver tent  comnand, operator e r ro r ,  o r  t e s t  equipment f a i l u r e .  
S t ray  voltages on ordnance power l i n e s  dur ing checkout. 
E l e c t r o s t a t i c  discharge from s t a t i c  charge bu i  I d  up. 
t h e  spacecraft.  
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY VERIFICATION METHODS: 
STATUS OF VERIF ICATION:  
a INO. FLIGHT: PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 6 
I 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer (PHASE: 0 
I 
I 
SUBSYSTEM: IHAZARD GROUP: I DATE : 
HAZARD TITLE: Hazardous Levels o f  Radiat ion 
Communications I Radiat ion I October 1986 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: [HAZARD CATEGORY: 
KHB 1700.7A - 4.3.4 I ICATASTROPHIC 
I XICRITICAL 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
Communication Transmit ter  emits l e v e l  o f  r a d i a t i o n  hazardous t o  personnel. 
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. Personnel present w i t h i n  range of  hazardous r a d i a t i o n  when t r a n s m i t t e r  
2. Inadver tent  t r a n s m i t t e r  ac t i va t i on .  
i s  On. 
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY V E R I F I C A T I O N  METHODS: 
c STATUS OF VERIF ICATION:  
APPROVAL 1 PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION I STS 
PHASE I I I 
PHASE I 1  I I 
PHASE I11 I I 
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INO. FLIGHT: 
I 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 7 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
I 
I 
SUBSYSTEM: ]HAZARD GROUP: F i r e  I DATE : 
HAZARD TITLE: I g n i t i o n  o f  Flammable Ma te r ia l s .  
E l  e c t r i  ca 1 I Explosion I October 1986 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
KHB 1700.7A - 4.3.2.3, 4.3.9 I XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
I g n i t i o n  sources i n  the  presence o f  flamnable ma te r ia l  dur ing spacecraft 
e l e c t r i c a l  checkout operations could cause a f i r e  o r  explosion r e s u l t i n g  i n  
damage t o  equipment, f a c i l i t i e s  and/or personnel i n j u r y .  
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. E l e c t r i c a l  f a u l t  r e s u l t i n g  i n  i g n i t i o n  o f  flammable mater ia ls.  
2. Use o f  flammable mater ia ls  i n  spacecraft design. 
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY VERIF ICATION METHODS: 
STATUS OF VERIF ICATION:  
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION I STS 
PHASE I I 
PHASE I1 I 
PHASE 111 I 
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INO. FLIGHT: 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 8 
I 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
I 
I 
SUBSYSTEM: Pyrotechnics I HAZARD GROUP: I n j u r y  I DATE: 
HAZARD TITLE: Postlanding Operations - Aborted Mission 
Propulsion I F i r e  I October 1986 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
KHB 1700.7A - 4.3.5, 4.3.7 I XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
Premature i g n i t i o n  of ordnance during removal o f  a cargo element a f t e r  an 
aborted mission could r e s u l t  i n  equipment damage, personnel i n j u r y ,  o r  f i r e .  
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. Inadver tent  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  power t o  EED's. 
2. St ray voltages on ordnance power l i nes .  
3 .  I n a b i l i t y  t o  r e t u r n  sa fe ty  i n h i b i t s  t h a t  may have been removed dur ing 
deployment operations t o  a safe conf igurat ion.  
4. Extreme temperatures a t  contingency landing s i t e s  causing over pressur- 
i z a t i o n  o f  p rope l l an t  tanks, l ines,  o r  sealed containers o r  f reez ing o f  
propel lant .  
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY VERIF ICATION METHODS: 
STATUS OF VERIFICATION:  
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION I STS 
PHASE I 
PHASE 111 1 I 
PHASE I 1  
I I 
I I 
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INO. FLIGHT: 
PAY LOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 9 
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION 
PHASE I 1 
PHASE I1  
I 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer )PHASE: 0 
STS 
1 
SUBSYSTEM: IHAZARD GROUP: Corrosion IDATE: 
E l e c t r i c a l  I Contamination I October 1986 
I I 
HAZARD TITLE: NiCd Ba t te r i es  Hazards 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
KHB 1700.7A - 4.3.2, 4.3.3 I XICATASTROPHIC 
1 ICRITICAL 
Rupture o f  t h e  NiCd b a t t e r y  c e l l s ,  re leas ing debr is  and/or e l e c t r o l y t e  causing 
f i r e  contamination and/or personnel in jury . .  
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. S t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e  of t he  NiCd ce l l s .  
2. Overpressurization caused by i n t e r n a l  o r  ex te rna l  short,  c e l l  reversa l ,  
overcharging, temperature extremes, o r  b a t t e r y  p l a t e  i n s u l a t o r  f a i l u r e .  
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY VERIF ICATION METHODS: 
STATUS OF VERIF ICATION:  
c 
INO. FLIGHT: 
I 
I 
I I 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 10 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
SUBSYSTEM: I HAZARD GROUP: I n j u r y  I DATE : 
HAZARD TITLE: 
Propulsion I Contamination, F i r e  I October 1986 
Inadver tent  F i r i n g  of  Thrusters o r  Leakage o f  Thrusters 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: IHAZARD CATEGORY: 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
KHB 1700.7A - 4.1.3 I XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
1. Inadver tent  f i r i n g  o f  t h r u s t e r s  could r e s u l t  i n  personnel i n j u r y ,  
2. 
equipment damage, o r  f i r e .  
Leakage o f  p r o p e l l a n t  through thrusters .  
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. 
2. F a i l u r e  o f  seats i n  valves. 
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
F a i l u r e s  i n  RCS system o r  inadvertent commands t h a t  al lows f l o w  o f  
p r o p e l l a n t  t o  t h e  th rus te rs .  
SAFETY VERIF ICATION METHODS: 
STATUS OF VERIF ICATION:  
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION I STS 
PHASE I I I 
~ 
PHASE I1 I I 
PHASE 111 I I 
111 
(NO. FLIGHT: 
I 
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT I GROUND: 11 
PAYLOAD: Mars Observer IPHASE: 0 
I 
1 
SUBSYSTEM: (HAZARD GROUP: I n j u r y  I DATE : 
HAZARD TITLE: Rotat ing Equipment 
Mechanical I Contamination I October 1986 
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENT: (HAZARD CATEGORY: 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: 
KHB 1700.7A - 4.3.6 I XICATASTROPHIC 
I ICRITICAL 
Debris f rom r o t a t i n g  equipment (RWAs) f a i l u r e  could damage Orbi ter ,  o r  cause 
i n j u r y  t o  personnel. 
HAZARD CAUSES: 
1. F a i l u r e  o f  r o t a t i n g  equipment ( r o t a t i n g  wheel assemblies) dur ing 
t e s t i n g  re leas ing debr is.  
HAZARD CONTROLS: 
SAFETY VERIF ICATION METHODS: 
STATUS OF V E R I F I C A T I O N :  
APPROVAL I PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION I STS 
~~ 
PHASE I1 I I 
PHASE 111 I I 
112 
